NONLEGISLATIVE RULEMAKING AND
REGULATORY REFORM
MICHAEL ASIMOW*

The adoption of interpretive rules and policy statemens is a vital

part of the administrativeprocess. These "nonlegislative" rules clarify
the language of statutes and prior rules and give structure to agency
discretionarypowers. Courts have encountered difficulty in distinguishing legislativefrom nonlegislative rules because the practicalimpact of

both kinds of rules may be the same. Regulatory reform proposals at
bothfederal and state levels would require agencies to employ notice and

comment procedures before adopting many nonlegislative rules. This
articlecontends that such requirementswould discourageagenciesfrom

adopting nonlegislative rules and thus would dramaticallydisserve the
public interest.

Both the federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)I and
the Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 19612 require agencies

to invite public participation before adopting legislative rules. However,
the two statutes prescribe different procedures for adopting nonlegislative
rules, 3 a category that includes interpretive4 rules and policy statements.
Under the federal APA, an agency has discretion to adopt nonlegislative rules without any pre- or post-adoption procedure, 5 other than a

requirement that it publish rules of general applicability in the Federal
* Professor of Law, UCLA Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable
help of Carl Auerbach, Richard Berg, Arthur Bonfield, Werner Hirsch, Frances Olsen, Bill Ong
Hing, and Sallyanne Payton.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (1982).
2. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1961, Section 3, 14 U.L.A. 387
(1980) [hereinafter cited as 1961 MODEL ACT].
3. Broadly speaking, a "legislative" rule is adopted pursuant to a delegation to an agency by a
legislature. See Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1153 n.24 (D.C. Cir.
1977). A "nonlegislative rule" is one adopted by an agency but not pursuant to delegation of legislative power.
Judicial decisions sometimes use the terms "substantive" or "nonsubstantive" rules whereas this
article uses the terms "legislative" or "nonlegislative" rules. The word "substantive" is confusing
because it is ordinarily the opposite of "procedural." See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(C), (D) (using the
term "substantive rules" in clear opposition to "rules of procedure"). However, none of the rules
discussed in this article are procedural. The distinction is between legislative and nonlegislative, not
substance and procedure. The APA exemption for procedural rules is not discussed in this article.
4. The APA uses the word "interpretative" whereas this article will use the stylistically preferable "interpretive." Both versions are in common use in statutes, judicial decisions, and scholarly
work.
5. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A), (d)(2). Of course, agencies frequently provide pre-adoption notice
and comment procedures even though not legally required to do so.
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Register after adoption. 6 The nonlegislative rule exemptions in the federal APA have proved difficult to apply in practice and have been the

subject of constant litigation. 7 In contrast, the 1961 Model State Act
requires the same pre-adoption procedure for legislative and nonlegislative rules. 8
Proposed federal regulatory reform legislation would sharply narrow the exemption provided by existing law. 9 Meanwhile, the recently
approved 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act provides only
modest exemptions for nonlegislative rules. °
This article contends that the costs of mandatory advance public
participation in the making of nonlegislative rules outweighs the benefits
and that the proposed statutory revisions will not solve the definitional
problems of existing law. As a result, this article argues that the state
and federal reform proposals should be rejected. Instead, this article endorses the proposal, adopted by the Administrative Conference of the
United States, that post-adoption participation be provided in nonlegislative rulemaking.1 1
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D).
7. For other discussions of the nonlegislative rule exemptions, see 1 and 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 6.30-.31, 7.4-7.21 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1982); Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of InterpretiveRules and PolicyStatements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 521 (1977);
Bonflield, Some Tentative Thoughts on PublicParticipationin the Making ofInterpretative Rules and
GeneralStatements ofPolicy under the A.P.A., 23 AD. L. REv. 101 (1971); Koch, Public Procedures
for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and GeneralStatements of Policy, 64 GEo. L.J. 1047
(1976); Warren, The Notice Requirement in Administrative Rulemaking: An Analysis of Legislative
and InterpretiveRules, 29 AD. L. REv. 367 (1977); Note, An Analysis of the General Statement of
Policy Exception to Notice and Comment Procedure,73 GEo. L.L 1007 (1985); Note, The Interpretive
Rule Exemption: A DefinitionalApproach to Its Application, 15 IND. L. REv. 875 (1982); Note,
Administrative Law-The Legislative-InterpretativeDistinction: Semantical Feinting with an Exception to Rulemaking Procedures, 54 N.C.L. REv. 421 (1976); Note, A FunctionalApproach to the
Applicability ofSection 553 of the Administrative ProcedureAct to Agency Statements ofPolicy, 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 430 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, A FunctionalApproach];Note, Revenue Rulings
and the Administrative ProcedureAct, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1135.
8. 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, at §§ 1(7), (3).
9. See infra notes 182-204 and accompanying text. Proponents of regulatory reform often
have been preoccupied with other matters. See, eg., Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process. The ContemporaryDebate, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 385, 438-42 (discussing competing ideals in regulatory reform); Strauss, Regulatory Reform in a Time of Transition, 15 SUFFOLK
U.L.REV. 903, 904 (1981) (discussing limits on regulatory reform).
10. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACr § 2-101, 14 U.L.A. 67 (1984 Supp.)
[hereinafter cited as the 1981 MODEL ACT]. See infra notes 132-81 and accompanying text. See
generally Bonfield, An Introduction to the 1981 Model State AdministrativeProcedureAct, Part1, 34
AD. L. REV. 1 (1982).
11. See infra notes 205-25 and accompanying text.

Vol. 1985:381]
I.
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NONLEGISLATIVE R ULEMAKING

NONLEGISLATIVE RULES: DEFINITIONS AND FUNCTIONS

PreliminaryDefinition of Terms.
The theoretical difference between legislative and nonlegislative

rules is clear. A legislative rule is essentially an administrative statute-

an exercise of previously delegated power, new law that completes an
incomplete legislative design. 1 2 Legislative rules frequently prescribe,
modify, or abolish duties, rights, or exemptions. In contrast, nonlegislative rules do not exercise delegated lawmaking power and thus are not
administrative statutes. Instead, they provide guidance to the public and

to agency staff and decisionmakers. They are not legally binding on
members of the public. 13
Interpretive rules and policy statements serve distinct functions. An
interpretive rule clarifies or explains the meaning of words used in a statute, a previous agency rule, or a judicial or agency adjudicative deci-

sion. 14 A policy statement, on the other hand, indicates how an agency
hopes or intends to exercise discretionary power in the course of per-

forming some other administrative function.'

5

For example, a policy

statement might indicate what factors will be considered and what goals

will be pursued when an agency conducts investigation, prosecution, legislative rulemaking, or formal or informal adjudication.
Although the theoretical difference between the legal effect of legis-

lative and nonlegislative rules is clear, the practical line-drawing problem
12. See, eg., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). The Court in Chrysler held that,
for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982), which permits disclosure of information only to the extent
"authorized by law," a legislative regulation permitting disclosure is "law" but an interpretive regulation is not. 441 U.S. at 301-03. See also Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v: de Ia Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 154 (1982) (legislative regulation preempts state law); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425
n.9 (1977) (limited scope of judicial review of legislative rule). Nonlegislative rules are not "law."
See Seegull Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 735 F.2d 971, 974 (NLRB's treatment of guidelines as "law" is a
display of "bureaucratic arrogance"), vacated, 741 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1984).
13. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See H. HART & A. SACHS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS 1315 (Tent. Ed. 1958). The regulations relating to the Federal Register Act
supply a helpful definition of "legal effect." A document has "legal effect" if it is "issued under
proper authority prescribing a penalty or course of conduct, conferring a right, privilege, authority,
" I1.
C.F.R. § 1.1 (1984).
or immunity, or imposing an obligation .
14. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE

APA]; Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
15. See, eg., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE APA, supra note 14, at 30 n.3 (policy
statements are "issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which an
agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power"); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE 1974 AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 21
(1975) (policy statements "articulate a settled course of action which would be pursued in a class of
matters entrusted to agency discretion"). See also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
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has proved difficult for a number of reasons. The most important reason
for the haziness of the distinction is that the practical impact of either
type of rule on members of the public is the same. Most members of the
public assume that all agency rules are valid, correct, and unalterable.
Consequently, most people attempt to conform to them rather than to
mount costly, time-consuming, and usually futile challenges. Although
legislative and nonlegislative rules are conceptually distinct and although
their legal effect is profoundly different, 16 the real-world consequences
are usually identical.
Another reason for the confusion surrounding the distinction is that
the legal effect of agency rules is often difficult to assess. For example,
both legislative and interpretive rules frequently interpret the meaning of
language in a statute.17 Similarly, both legislative rules and policy statements often prescribe the manner in which an agency will exercise discretionary power."' Moreover, an enormous variety of agency actions can
be plausibly characterized as rules. Because their legal effect is difficult
to determine, such actions typically resist easy placement in legislative or
nonlegislative pigeonholes. 1 9
Finally, it often serves the interests of both agencies and courts to
blur or manipulate the distinction between legislative and nonlegislative
rules. 20 In classifying rules, the "intention" of the agency is critical, 2 1 yet
courts understandably have been reluctant to accept an agency's own
characterization at face value. 22 Indeed, the courts themselves have
sometimes manipulated the distinction to achieve results sought for other
23
reasons.
16. For example, a court's power to substitute its judgment for that of the agency is much
greater in the case of nonlegislative rules. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 592 (1983) (legislative rule
defines "discrimination"); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 419 (1977) (legislative rule defines
"unemployment"); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 608-09 (1944) (legislative rule defines "area of production"); British Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. CAB, 584 F.2d 982, 991
(D.C. Cir. 1978) ("simplistic" to draw distinction based on whether rule explains statute).
18. See, eg., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969) (legislative rules
indicate how FCC will apply "public interest" standard). See
infra note 30.
19. See Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 700-04 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
20. Agencies are sometimes uncertain whether they possess delegated power or whether they
wish to exercise it. See, eg., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304-09 (1979).
21. See infra notes 39-40, 60-62 accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
23. See,
Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 816-17 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
discussed infra at notes 50-55 and accompanying text; Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1478-83 (11th
Cir. 1983) (policy concerning Haitian refugees is legislative rule), vacated as moot on this point, 727
F.2d 957 (11th Cir.),
granted, 105 S. Ct. 563 (1984).
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Role of Nonlegislative Rules in the Administrative Process.

Nearly every agency engages constantly in the processes of legal interpretation and the structuring and narrowing of its statutory discretion.
The adoption of nonlegislative rules is one way in which an agency might
carry out these functions.
1. Interpretation. Interpretation is an indispensable part of administration, because the meaning of language in administrative materials is often obscure, ambiguous, or abstract. 24 To conduct their business,
agency heads and staff must fill the gaps, resolve ambiguities, and reduce
abstractions to a practical and concrete level.
An agency might simply decide not to deal with an interpretive
problem, leaving the public without guidance and allowing the staff to
work things out on a case-by-case basis. However, if it seems worthwhile
to arrive at an agreed-upon definition or application of language, an
agency might use one of several techniques. If it has delegated power, it
can perform the interpretive function by adopting a definitive legislative
rule. It might also interpret language in the course of formal or informal
adjudication or by issuing a declaratory order. It can provide interpretive guidance in answering requests for advice by individual members of
the public, or it can include interpretive material in instructional
manuals.
The final alternative is to adopt and publish a nonlegislative ititerpretive rule of general applicability. Countless interpretive rules are
adopted each year by federal agencies. Revenue rulings issued by the
Internal Revenue Service, advisory opinions about Hatch Act issues by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, and interpretive bulletins issued by
25
the Federal Reserve System are three prominent examples.
Interpretive material helps assure consistent day-to-day administration by agency staff and provides an invaluable resource for members of
the public. Of course, an agency's legal interpretation is not legally binding on anyone;26 courts and members of the public are free to disagree
with it. In practice, however, an agency's view of the correct resolution
of legal questions usually provides the final answer. Few agency inter27
pretations are challenged in court and almost all of those are upheld.
24. See generally M. AsIMOw, ADVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES ch. 1, 2 (1973); Morgenthau, Implied Regulatory Powers in AdministrativeLaw, 28 IowA
L. REV. 575 (1943).
25. See 2 K. DAVIS,, supra note 7, at § 7.4.
26. In a few instances the interpretation may be binding on the agency itself. See id. at § 7.21.
27. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 2778,
2782-83 (1984) (deference to reasonable agency policy choice).
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Because the public must live with agency interpretations, it should have
the fullest possible access to them. Interpretive rules of general application provide guidance to both staff and public. Their issuance should be
encouraged in preference to agency inaction or to providing guidance
through such relatively inaccessible sources as informal adjudication, private advice, or staff manuals.
2. Policy Statements. Staff members in most agencies have broad
discretion whether to initiate an investigation, audit a return, grant a license, an exemption, or a dispensation, recommend prosecution, or take
enforcement action. Agencies may or may not provide guidance to the
staff as to how this discretion should be exercised. 2 8 An agency might
furnish guidance in a number of ways. It might allow its decisionmakers
to exercise the power in the course of conducting formal or informal adjudications, or in answering requests for guidance from the public; each
such decision would provide some guidance to future decisionmakers,
staff, and the public. An agency might also direct the staff by issuing
bulletins or instructions in a manual.
Often, as an agency gains experience in exercising a particular
power, it may formulate that experience in more or less precise rules that
would guide the staff. At the outset, the guidance might take the form of
answers to hypothetical questions about what the staff might do in various circumstances. Alternatively, it might simply provide a checklist or
itemize the factors to be taken into account without explaining how to
weigh them. 29 Later, an agency may state tentative standards in the form
of a nonlegislative rule. Ultimately, an agency may be willing to commit
itself to a legislative rule that definitively and rigidly prescribes how the
30
power will be exercised.
Policy statements are nonlegislative rules that tentatively indicate
28. Of course, even if an agency furnishes no guidance to staff members, the people who must
make the decisions usually evolve a set of guidelines for themselves. Often, one or a few staff members will accumulate expertise in dealing systematically with recurring problems. See Gifford, Decisions, DecisionalReferents, and Administrative Justice, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROas. 3, 5-11 (1972)
(discussing the constraints that are internally developed by those to whom administrative authority
is delegated).
29. See, eg., Proposed Rules of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 44 Fed. Reg,
36,187 (1979), withdrawn, 46 Fed. Reg. 9119 (1981).

30. Discretionary functions are often the subject of legislative rules. See, e.g., Diver, The Optimal PrecisionofAdministrativeRules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 92-97 (1983) (limiting discretion in immigration cases). The progression from less to more rigid confinement of discretion is described in K.
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 59-64 (1969). For the classic description of incremental decisionmaking, see Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 Pun.
AD. REV. 79, 80-88 (1959).
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how agency decisionmakers will exercise a discretionary power.3 1 Such
rules might, for example, isolate the factors that should be considered in
making decisions, rank priorities, set tolerance levels, explain when dispensations should be granted, build flexibility into overly rigid rules, indicate what data are relevant, or otherwise narrow the available decisional
referents that must be taken into account. Some familiar examples are
the policy statements adopted by the Federal Communications Commission, the Operations Instructions of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the Merger Guidelines and the FBI Investigative Guidelines of
the Department of Justice, and the revenue procedures published by the
32
Internal Revenue Service.
Agencies frequently consider whether a discretion-structuring rule
should be adopted or made more precise. Certainly, greater precision
entails significant costs, including the bureaucratic costs of formulating a
rule. 33 Formulation costs are often steep, because the staff members who
have dealt with the problem may themselves be uncertain precisely why
and how they do what they do. In addition, discretion-confining rules

may be over-or under-inclusive, decisionmaking under the rule may be
unjustifiably rigid, 34 and the rule may highlight loopholes. Nevertheless,

commentators generally agree that agencies should face and resolve the
questions of how discretion will be exercised much more frequently than
they do at present, 35 a process that offers advantages to both the agency
31. Statements of general policy must be currently published in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(1)(D). Other statements of policy (presumably those that are particular rather than general) must be made available for public inspection and copying. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B). On the
publication requirement, see Comment, Publication Under the Freedom of Information Act of Statements of GeneralPolicy andInterpretationsof General Applicability, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 351 (1980);
Note, A Modelfor Determiningthe PublicationRequirements ofSection 552(a)(1) of the Administrative ProcedureAct, 13 MICH. J. L. REP. 515 (1980).
32. See, eg., Eliff, The Attorney General's Guidelinesfor FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L.
REv. 785 (1984). A detailed account of the practices of four agencies in using interpretive rules and
policy statements appears in Asimow, supra note 7, at 524-28 (discussing IRS, INS, FCC, and FTC
practices).
33. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
34. See Cancellation of proposed rule by the Immigration & Naturalization Service, 46 Fed.
Reg. 9119 (1981) (guidelines may become so rigid as to amount to abuse of discretion); E. BARDACH
& R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK 58-119 (1982) (discussion of practical problems inherent in
rigid enforcement); Diver, supra note 30, at 71-76.
35. Most commentators believe that the benefits of supplying additional structure usually outweigh the costs of doing so and thus urge agencies to confine discretion far more often than they do.
For perspectives from political science, economics, public administration, and law, see generally P.
COOPER, PUBLIC LAW AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 213-32 (1983); K. DAVIS, supranote 30; T.
LOWi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 10-19, 302-05 (2d ed. 1979); G. TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF
BUREAUCRACY 180-85 (1965); Diver, supra note 30, at 92-97 (advocating clearer standards to constrain INS discretion to change alien status); Gifford, DiscretionaryDecisionmakingin the Regulatory Agencies: A Conceptual Framework 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 101, 102-34 (1983) (analysis of which
discretionary powers lend themselves to structure); Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule:
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and the public.
For the agency, the very process of considering how a particular
power might be structured often results in a productive process of 36selfcriticism and the generation of alternatives and fresh points of view. If
an agency can reach consensus on how to confine discretion, the personnel who must exercise it are more likely to do so consistently and fairly.
In addition, policy statements tend to minimize the inevitable distortions
of agency priorities that result from a multilevel delegation within an
institution. Moreover, an informed public is more likely to conform vol37
untarily to the law, thus minimizing enforcement costs.
To the public that must live with an agency's discretionary power,
knowledge of how that power will be used is extremely valuable. It
opens a window on an agency's decisional process and thus enables a
person who is detrimentally affected to make an informed argument to
the correct staff member that an exception should be made. It permits
everyone who must deal with the agency equal access to vital information, thus diminishing the advantage held by experienced professionals or
former agency staff members. Finally, policy statements enable the public to plan transactions with more precise knowledge of how agencies will
react. As a result, a person subject to regulation or seeking a benefit is
less likely to encounter difficulties with the agency. To the extent that
disputes between government and regulated parties can be avoided
through proper advance planning, both sides avoid the38deadweight loss
associated with dispute settlement and thwarted plans.
General policy statements are well calculated to control staff action
and, because they must be published in the Federal Register, to inform
the public. They provide authoritative guidance on what the staff is
likely to do, yet unlike legislative rules they remain tentative, not rigid.
Consequently, they leave decisionmakers room for flexible application;
they do not foreclose further experimentation and learning from
experience.
RegulatoryEquity and the FormulationofEnergy Policy Through an ExceptionsProcess, 1984 DUKE
L.J. 163, 268-69, 294-98; Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal DiscretionaryAdjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1295 (1972) (unconfined discretion led to inconsistency, political intervention, high reversal rates, extra decisional costs, and severely disadvantaged

unrepresented aliens); Note, Regulatory Values and the Exceptions Process, 93 YALE L.J. 938 (1984).
36. See Gifford, supra note 28, at 22-26, 29-30.
37. See Hirsch, ReducingLaw's Uncertaintyand Complexity, 21 UCLA L. REv. 1233, 1234-36
(1974).
38. See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. oF LEGAL STUD.
257, 262-67 (1974).
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JUDICIAL TECHNIQUES FOR DRAWING THE LEGISLATIVE/
NONLEGISLATIVE DISTINCTION

As we have seen, the theoretical difference between legislative and
nonlegislative rules is clear. Legislative rules exercise delegated legislative power; nonlegislative rules do not. In many instances, an agency can
choose to proceed legislatively or nonlegislatively, and there can be little
dispute over the characterization of the resulting product: The agency
explicitly declares that it intends to act either legislatively or nonlegisla-

tively and that declared intention corresponds with the legal effect of the
rule.

Unfortunately, a substantial number of cases remain in which the
decision whether a rule is legislative or nonlegislative is considerably

more difficult. This section outlines two different approaches to the
problem-the prevailing legal effect standard and the increasingly re-

jected substantial impact test. An appreciation of the difficulties encountered in applying these tests is helpful in assessing proposed regulatory
reform of the procedures for adopting nonlegislative rules.
A.

The Agency's Label.
When an agency has a choice to proceed legislatively or nonlegisla-

tively, its contemporaneous description is the most reliable test of what it
actually did.39 Because an agency can choose to interpret law or limit

discretion through legislative rulemaking, nonlegislative rulemaking, adjudication, or other techniques, it is appropriate to accept the agency's

description of which alternative it chose at the time it made the choice.
Deference to the agency's label also promotes certainty and predictability
of result and provides agencies with reasonable assurance that reviewing
courts will honor their decision to proceed nonlegislatively. Thus, an
agency's contemporaneously-adopted 4° description of its intention and
39. See, eg., American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337, 1344 (1lth Cir. 1982)
(interpretive rule), reversed on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2458 (1984); British Caledonian Airways,
Ltd. v. CAB, 584 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(declaratory order); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC,
506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(policy statement). See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 31216 (1979)(rule interpretive because agency so treated it). However, the Senate Judiciary Committee
has sharply criticized undue judicial deference to an agency's label. See The Regulatory Reform
Act, S. Rep. No. 284, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1981) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
40. Subsequent characterizations by counsel are much less persuasive. See Regular Common
Carrier Conference of the Am. Trucking Ass'n. v. United States, 628 F.2d 248, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
In Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 179-81 (lst Cir. 1983), the court gave no deference to a "latearising" claim that a rule was interpretive. According to the decision by Judge McGowan, late
characterizations mislead the public, which is entitled to know whether a rule is legislative or not.
Deference to a post-hoe characterization encourages an agency to "'act now, make up reasons
later.'" Id. at 180.
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desired legal effect is and should be of central importance in characterizing its product.
Unfortunately, a court cannot always rely on labels to distinguish

between legislative and nonlegislative rules. Agencies may provide vague
or contradictory descriptions of their rules, or may fail to characterize
their pronouncements at all. 4 1 Moreover, an agency, unsure whether it

has delegated power or, if it does, whether it wishes to exercise it, may
try to disguise the issue by failing to describe its product clearly. In other
cases, confusion may be caused by poor staff work. For example, staff
members may fail to clarify whether a pronouncement that amplifies a

legislative rule is intended to amend the rule or merely to inteipret it.
Finally, an agency might overlook the fact that a rule labelled as nonlegislative is, for some reason, legally binding on someone or some other

agency, and cannot properly be treated as nonlegislative.4 2
Thus, many courts have declared that labels are entitled to judicial
deference, but cannot be dispositive of the issue of the proper characterization of a rule.4 3 Courts consistently question whether the chosen label
correctly describes the legal effect of a particular rule. Otherwise, an
agency might manipulate its description in order to avoid pre-enforcement judicial review,44 keep a low proffle,4 5 or circumvent cumbersome
notice and comment requirements, 46 while achieving the desired change
in staff and private party behavior.
B. Policy Statements: The Definitiveness Test.
Policy statements and many legislative rules are addressed to discretionary functions. A difficult characterization problem is often presented
when an agency with delegated legislative power chooses to adopt a pol41. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1482 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated as moot on this issue,
727 F.2d 957, 962 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 563 (1984).
42. See, eg., Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 704-06 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
43. See, e.g., First Bancorp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 728 F.2d 434, 438
(10th Cir. 1984) (policy statement in informal adjudication treated as legislative rule); American Bus
Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (policy statement treated as legislative
rule); Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 468-69 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (interpretive rule
treated as legislative); Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1153 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (same).
44. A legislative rule is more likely than a nonlegislative rule to be held ripe for judicial review
before it is applied, although many nonlegislative rules have been held to meet the ripeness test. See
infra note 213; Asimow, supra note 7, at 567-69.
45. See First Bancorp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 728 F.2d 434, 438 (10th
Cir. 1984) (Board attempted to announce significant policy change through informal adjudication);
Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1470-82 (1lth Cir. 1983) (INS consciously chose not to promulgate
rule after making policy change), vacated as moot on this issue, 727 F.2d 957, 962 (1lth Cir.), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 563 (1984).
46. See, eg., Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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icy statement without prior notice and comment. The prevailing criterion for analyzing this issue is the "definitiveness" test. If the court finds
that a discretionary power has been tentatively limited, the agency's pronouncement is a policy statement; if it finds that the power is definitively
limited, the pronouncement is a legislative rule. 47
The definitiveness rule clearly leaves much to be desired as a manageable and predictable standard for judicial decisionmaking. Because it
hinges on whether a rule definitively or tentatively channels discretion,
the test requires a prediction of the agency's future behavior, and the
result will often turn on whether the staff used mandatory or precatory
48
language.
On the other hand, the definitiveness test has some positive aspects.
It provides a serviceable roadmap by which agencies can confine discretionary power without inviting advance public participation. An agency
can be reasonably certain that notice and comment procedure will not be
required if it labels a discretion-structuring rule as a policy statement,
builds in assurances that the rule is tentative, and treats it in actual practice as tentative.
In addition, the definitiveness test has a certain compelling logic. If
the public is denied an advance opportunity to influence a policy statement, it should have a fair chance to persuade a decisionmaker to follow
a different course when the discretionary function is actually exercised in
a subsequent investigation, formal or informal adjudication, or other
proceeding.
Several factors are helpful in applying the definitiveness test. One is
a realistic assessment of the tentativeness of a rule. Rules that seem tentative or suggestive, leaving room for decisionmakers to exercise judgment, are properly characterized as policy statements. 49 In contrast, a
47. See, e.g., Simmons v. ICC, 757 F.2d 296, 300 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (agency cannot treat policy
statement as binding authority in later rulemaking); American Bus Ass'n. v. United States, 627 F.2d
525, 531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
48. The "definitiveness test" has frustrated a number of courts. See eg., Jean v. Nelson, 711
F.2d 1455, 1480 (1lth Cir. 1983) (test is a morass "akin to wandering lost in a serbonian bog"),
vacated as moot on this point, 727 F.2d 957, 962 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 563 (1984);
American Bus Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 528-29 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (drawing the line is
"hazardous"); Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(test calls for intuitive judgment); Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir.) (test is "enshrouded in considerable smog"), cert denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC,
506 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C.Cir. 1974) (distinction is a "fuzzy product") (quoting I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 5.01, at 290 (2d ed. 1958)).
49. See, e.g., Ryder Truck Lines v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1376-78 (11th Cir. 1983);
Burroughs Welcome Co. v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 221, 225 (4th Cir. 1981); Guardian Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n. v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 666-68 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506
F.2d 33, 38-43 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Asimow, supra note 7, at 540 n.87.
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rule adopted by an agency with legislative rulemaking power that appears to preclude the exercise of discretion, prescribes how it must be
exercised, or leaves no administrative forum in which the exercise of discretion can be challenged, should be considered legislative.
Consider, for example, EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. Gorsuch,5 0 a
case that allowed the court to play a role in the political struggles that
engulfed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early in the Reagan Administration. A statute required EPA to set standards for hazardous waste processing and also required waste processors to meet EPA's
standards in order to apply for licenses. Existing processors were permitted to operate with temporary licenses until EPA adopted the standards
and called in their temporary licenses.5 1 EPA duly adopted standards,
but under political pressure from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), gave notice that it proposed to suspend them. It also announced
as a matter of "policy" that because the regulatory standards that would
condition permanent licenses might be suspended, EPA would defer call52
ing in the temporary processing licenses.
EPA defended the "policy" as a reasonable resource allocation: It
was reluctant to issue permanent licenses conditioned on compliance
with standards that it proposed to suspend. The EPA also observed that
its "policy" was not definitive, because it was free to call in the tempo53
rary license of any particular processor.
Declaring that APA exemptions should be strictly construed, particularly where an agency reverses its position, the court held that the substance of the "policy" was an indefinite exemption of the processors from
meeting the standards that EPA had already adopted and that Congress
intended would be observed to protect public health.5 4 The "policy" was
not likely to be waived and there was no obvious proceeding in which the
issue might even be raised. In short, the court held that EPA's "policy"
50. 713 F.2d 802, 816-17 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1478-83
(I lth Cir. 1983), vacated as moot on thispoint,727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 563
(1984); Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm'n v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 467 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Brown Express, Inc. v.
United States, 607 F.2d 695, 701 (5th Cir. 1979); Dow Chemical v. CPSC, 459 F. Supp. 378, 392-93

(W.D. La. 1978); United States ex rel Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 984-85 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
But see Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283, 294 (D.D.C. 1978) (upholding rigid

"trigger price mechanism" as policy statement). In Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d
1107, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1974), an early decision based primarily on substantial impact analysis, the

court held that rules which tightly (but not definitively) limited the discretion of parole decisionmakers could not be treated as policy statements.
51. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 805, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
52. See id. at 808.
53. See id.
at 816.
54. Id. at 816-17.
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was definitive, not tentative, and, as a legislative rule, was invalid for
want of advance notice and comment procedure. 55
A second factor that courts take into account when deciding
whether a rule that confines a power is tentative or definitive is the precise wording used by the agency. For example, a rule that uses rebuttable presumptions,5 6 or that uses words of suggestion, like "may" or
"should consider," rather than inflexible words of command, 57 is likely

to be a policy statement.
A third factor that courts may consider is actual administrative experience in applying a rule. If agency decisionmakers seem genuinely
open to contrary suggestions in subsequent proceedings, a rule is likely to
be a policy statement. If, however, decisionmakers appear to view themselves as bound by the rule, it may be treated as legislative.5 8

C. Interpretive Rules: Legal Effect Test.
When a court reviews a language-interpreting rule that was adopted
by an agency with legislative rulemaking power, it must begin by charac-

terizing the rule. Most importantly, whether a rule is legislative or inter55. See id. at 817-18.
56. See Regular Common Carrier Conference of the Am. Trucking Ass'n. v. United States, 628
F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ryder Truck Lines v. United States, 716 F.2d 1369, 1376-78 (1lth Cir.
1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1707 (1984).
57. See Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
American Bus Ass'n. v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The American Bus
decision drew support from the famous case of Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States,
316 U.S. 407 (1942). See American Bus, 627 F.2d at 530-31 (discussing CBS). The CBS Court
permitted pre-enforcement review of legislative rules despite the fact that the FCC had labelled them
policy statements, because they were definitive rather than tentative and contained mandatory language. See 316 U.S. 407, 416-20 (1942).
58. See Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1482-83 (1lth Cir. 1983), vacatedas moot on thispoint,
727 F.2d 957, 963 (11th Cir.), cerL granted, 105 S. Ct. 563 (1984); American Bus Ass'n. v. United
States, 627 F.2d 525, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
A few other factors have occasionally been suggested, but these appear relatively unhelpful.
Where a rule is styled as a temporary or interim solution to a problem, it is less likely to be considered legislative than one that operates indefinitely or permanently. See E. TOMLINSON, FINAL REPORT IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION'76-2 STRENGTHENING THE INFORMATIONAL AND
NOTICE GIVING FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, 4 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: JULY 1, 1974 - DECEMBER 31,
1977 427, 463 (1976) (the operative life of policy statement should be short); Dow Chem. v. CPSC,
459 F. Supp. 378, 392 (W.D. La. 1978). A rule addressed to agency staff is more likely to be a policy
statement that one addressed to the public. See Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975); Bonfield, supra note 7, at 115. Finally, some courts have indicated
that a policy statement with present as well as prospective effect is a legislative rule. See, eg., Brown
Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 701 (5th Cir. 1979). However, this approach seems
misconceived. A rule is a policy statement if it tentatively channels discretionary action; whether
that action is part of an ongoing proceeding, or only one contemplated in the future, seems unimportant. See Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d at 1478, 1482.
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pretive determines whether the court must defer to the agency's policy
judgments or whether the court can substitute its own judgments.5 9 In
addition, of course, the appropriate procedure for adopting the rule turns
on whether it is legislative or interpretive.
The prevailing standard for distinguishing legislative and interpretive rules can be described as the "legal effect" test. If a rule explaining
the meaning of language actually makes "new law," as opposed to merely
interpreting "existing law," it is legislative. Because both legislative and
interpretive rules frequently explain the meaning of language, 60 there is
no obvious way to determine whether an agency with legislative rulemaking power has made "new law" or interpreted "existing law."16' Thus,
the result often turns on whether an agency "intended" to make new law,
and that determination necessarily must depend primarily on the label
62
that the agency attached to its product.
Courts confront the characterization issue in two distinct situations-rules that explain the meaning of a statute and rules that explain
the meaning of a previous legislative rule.
1. Rules That Explain Statutes. In considering whether a rule
that explains a statute is interpretive, courts consider a number of factors
in addition to the agency's label or an assessment of its intention. A rule
makes "new law," as opposed to interpreting "existing law," if it fills a
statutory gap by imposing a standard of conduct, creating an exemption
from a standard of conduct, erecting a new regulatory structure, or
otherwise implementing congressional policy by completing an incomplete statutory design. 63 Suppose, for example, that Congress allows an
agency to exempt certain transactions from the coverage of a regulatory
statute. Without a rule, such transactions would not be exempt. A rule
59. See, eg., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 141 (1976). See also infira notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
61. One judge has criticized this standard as a "riddle." See Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349,
393 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 690 (1976).
62. See, eg., General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("if
by its action the agency intends to create new law . . . the rule is properly considered to be a
legislative rule"), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2153 (1985); Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 182-83 (1st
Cir. 1983) (reliance on good cause exemption suggests agency intended legislative effect). On the

other hand, omission of notice and comment would suggest that the agency did not intend legislative
effect. See Board of Educ. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1979).
63. See Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (detailed rules establishing mathematical formulae for determining individual contributions to pension funds are legislative); Batterton
v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 705-06 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464,
469 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 877-79 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
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64
spelling out an exemption would necessarily be legislative.

As a consequence, the more vague and open-textured a statute, the

more likely that a rule implementing it will be legislative rather than
interpretive. 65 On the other hand, if the statutory provision in issue is

detailed, leaving relatively little room for agency implementation, a rule

explaining the statute is more likely to be considered interpretive.6 6 Similarly, a rule that conforms closely to the language of the 67statute is likely
to be considered a mere reminder and thus interpretive.
Another relevant factor in distinguishing between legislative and in-

terpretive rules is the specificity with which an agency's delegated legislative power has been expressed. In many cases, legislative rulemaking
power is conferred by a specific statutory provision.68 In other instances,
however, a statute provides only a general rulemaking authority applicable to the entire statute; under the prevailing view, at least in the federal
courts, general rulemaking provisions empower an agency to make either
interpretive or legislative rules.6 9 Several courts have indicated that, in
doubtful cases, rules made pursuant to specific rulemaking powers are
more likely to be treated as legislative than are rules made pursuant to
70
general rulemaking powers.
64. See Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1153-55 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Hatch Act delegated authority to exempt government employees from provisions of act; rules
promulgated pursuant to such delegation are legislative).
65. See American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337, 1344 n.12 (lth Cir. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2458 (1984).
66. See American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 559 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1594 (1984).
67. See Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984); Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 238
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 876 n.153 (D.C. Cir.
1979). But see Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1983) (rule that restates statute is
legislative because it supplied effective date).
68. Such statutes typically contain wording like "pursuant to rules adopted by the secretary."
69. See, eg., National Nutritional Foods Ass'n. v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 695 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676-78
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). However, the general rulemaking power in the
Internal Revenue Code has been interpreted to confer authority only to adopt interpretive rules. See
Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
70. See Alaniz v. Office of Personnel Management, 728 F.2d 1460, 1468 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 183 (1st Cir. 1983); Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 393 (D.C.
Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). Cf Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 303-12 (1979).
A few other criteria have influenced courts to find that a rule did or did not have legislative
effect. Where a rule defied a definitive judicial construction of a statute, it could only be legislative in
effect. See Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 468-69 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Because administrative interpretation is always subject to judicial reassessment, an interpretation that could not
be judicially reviewed might well be legislative. See General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 724 F.2d
979, 984 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (because judicial review is possible, rule could be interpretive), rev'd
on other groundsupon hearing en ban 742 F.2d 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2153
(1985). A rule that is binding on other agencies, such as state welfare departments, necessarily has
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2. Rules That Explain Rules. Many rules explain or clarify previous legislative rules. 71 If a second rule repudiates or is irreconcilable
with the prior one, the second rule must be an amendment of the first;
and, of course, an amendment to a legislative rule must itself be legislative. 72 Usually, however, the second rule is consistent with the earlier
one. In such cases there is no principled way to determine whether it
amends the prior rule or merely explains, clarifies, or interprets it,73 and
courts by necessity usually defer to an agency's characterization of its
intent. 74
On occasion, courts find second rules legislative when they deal with
a matter not clearly covered by an earlier legislative rule. For example,
Standard Oil Co. v. Departmentof Energy7 5 concerned petroleum price
controls. The Department had established legislative rules allowing pe-

troleum sellers to raise prices in order to recover cost increases, but permitting greater price increases if the cost increase was in product rather

than nonproduct costs. However, the legislative rules failed to specify
how to determine whether a price increase was traceable to an increase in

product or nonproduct costs when both costs had increased. The agency
issued a subsequent rule, labelled as "interpretive," to solve the problem,
but the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals held that it was legisla76
tive, because the issue had not been covered in the prior legislative rule.
The Standard Oil case is unusual; most decisions simply declare the sec-

ond rule consistent with the first and thus interpretive. The decision
legislative effect. See Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (rule held to be legislative
because it limited state discretion and imposed obligation on states not found in statute itself); Aiken
v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628, 649 (E.D. Cal. 1977). A rule that is consistent with prior agency
practice is likely to be interpretive since it does not create "new rights or duties." General Motors v.
Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d at 1565. Finally, a rule that relates to the scope of an agency's delegated
power is usually interpretive, because a court should have plenary power to make the ultimate decision on this issue. See Allied Van Lines v. ICC, 708 F.2d 297, 300 (7th Cit. 1983).
71. A rule changing a prior interpretive rule would generally be interpretive. See American
Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1594 (1984). On the other hand, a rule that replaces a repealed legislative rule is
likely to be legislative. See Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 183 (1st Cir. 1983).
72. See Alaniz v. Office of Personnel Management, 728 F.2d 1460, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Detroit Edison Co. v. EPA, 496 F.2d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 1974).
73. The leading case states the "test" in conclusory terms: An interpretive rule is an agency's
opinion as to the meaning of an existing rule, whereas a legislative rule creates new law. See Gibson
Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1952). But see id. at 335 (second rule so clearly
at variance with the earlier rule that the second one could not be an interpretation) (Miller, J.,
dissenting). See also Asimow, supra note 7, at 545 n.107.
74. See, eg., Viacom Int'l. Inc. v. FCC, 672 F.2d 1034, 1042 (2d Cir. 1982); Carter v. Cleland,
643 F.2d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d
1082, 1092-93 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
75. 596 F.2d 1029, 1035 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979).
76. Id. at 1061.
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seemed influenced by the substantial impact of the rule on regulated parties, the subject addressed in the next section.

In many cases, a court that reviews a second rule may avoid the
procedural problem entirely by merging it with the issue of substantive
validity. If the court finds the second rule consistent with the first one, it
follows both that the second rule is interpretive and also that it is sub-

stantively valid. 77 If the second rule is inconsistent with the first one, it is
invalid both for procedural reasons (because it was an amendment
adopted without notice and comment) and substantive reasons (it could

not be a valid interpretation of the earlier rule if inconsistent with it).
D.

The SubstantialImpact Test.
As we have seen, the prevailing test used to distinguish legislative

and nonlegislative rules centers on the legal effect that an agency intended the rule to have. A conflicting line of cases holds that the critical
factor in drawing the distinctions is the substantiality of the practical
impact of a rule. Under this approach, pre-adoption procedure is re-

quired if a rule has a substantial practical impact on a significant body of
78
regulated persons.

The substantial impact test enjoyed a considerable vogue in the early
to middle 1970's. Since then, courts have cautiously but consistently re-

jected it in deciding whether to require notice and comment procedure
before adoption of a purportedly nonlegislative rule.7 9 Nevertheless, the
77. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 910-13 (5th Cir. 1983); National
Retired Teachers' Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 593 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
78. See, eg., Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Del. 1970). By statute, the Federal
Energy Administration at one time had to furnish an opportunity for oral presentation of views,
data, and arguments before adopting a rule that would have a substantial impact on the economy or
on large numbers of individuals or businesses. See 15 U.S.C. § 766(i)(1)(C)(1976), repealedby Pub.
L. No. 95-91, § 709(a)(1)(c), 91 Stat. 565, 608 (1977). For a case holding an agency rule invalid due
to failure to comply with this statutory requirement of opportunity for oral presentation of views, see
Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Admin., 574 F.2d 512 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
79. See, eg., Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1591-92 (1984); American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 559-60
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1594 (1984); Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237-38 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337, 1351-52 & n.20 (11th Cir.
1982) (stating that the substantial impact test is "only one, weakly relevant consideration in the
legislative rule determination"), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2458, 2468 (1984); Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082, 1093-98, 1102-03, 1103-12 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1978) (plurality opinion rejects substantial impact test but concurring and dissenting
opinions accept it); Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1290 n.30 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26, 44-46 (1976). But see Batterton v. Marshall, 648
F.2d 694, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029, 1061
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979); Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 394 (D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
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substantial impact test remains important for a number of related purposes. It is a factor in deciding whether the procedural 0 or good cause
exemptions"' apply. It is also relevant in deciding whether a procedural

defect should be overlooked as a harmless error, 2 whether a nonlegislative rule must be published in the FederalRegister, 3 and whether a ret-

roactive legislative rule is valid. 84 Finally, the substantial impact test is
useful as a guide to agencies in deciding whether voluntarily to invite
public participation before adopting a particularly important nonlegislative rule.8 5

Although it has been rejected by most courts, the substantial impact
test has been praised by several commentators.8 6 More important, it has
been transplanted into proposed federal regulatory reform bills that
would write the substantial impact test into the statute.8 7 Therefore, an
understanding of how the test has been applied by the courts, and of its
advantages and shortcomings, is essential in evaluating the reform

legislation.
Judges who have used the substantial impact test have stressed a
number of factors in assessing the substantiality of a rule's impact. These
factors relate both to the nature of the impact and the nature of the rule.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) exempts from notice and comment requirements "rules of agency
organization, procedure or practice." See United States Dep't of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744
F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1984); National Ass'n of Home Health Agencies v. Schweiker, 690 F.2d
932, 949-50 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld,
564 F.2d 663, 669 (4th Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978); Pennsylvania v. United States,
361 F. Supp. 208, 220 (M.D. Pa.), affd per curiam, 414 U.S. 1017 (1973); National Motor Freight
Traffic Ass'n. v. United States, 268 F. Supp., 90, 95 (D.D.C. 1967), affd per curiam, 393 U.S. 18
(1968).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) exempts a rule from notice and comment requirements "when the
agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in
the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." See, eg., Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 184-85 (1st Cir. 1983). See
generally Jordan, The Administrative ProcedureAct's"Good Cause" Exemption, 36 AD. L. REV. 113
(1984).
82. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082, 1095 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
83. See Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D.N.M. 1976).
84. See, eg., Heckler v. Community Health Servs. 104 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 n.12 (1984); Buccaneer
Point Estates, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1297, 1299 (11th Cir. 1984); Anderson, Clayton & Co.
v. United States, 562 F.2d 972, 980-85 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978) (among
factors in determining validity of retroactive legislative tax regulation are the strength of taxpayer's
reliance interest and the harshness of according retroactive effect).
85. See infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
86. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 7, at § 7.18; Warren, supra note note 7, at 386-93, 397-98;
Koch, supra note 7, at 1058-71; Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the Rulemaking versus AdjudicationProblem in Agency Lawmaking, 1980 DUKE L.J. 103, 122-29; Note, A FunctionalApproach,
supra note 7, at 443-46.
87. See infra notes 182-204 and accompanying text.
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In assessing the degree of impact, courts consider the degree to which the

rule is pervasive in scope,88 whether it seems to have a definable, significant, and self-executing impact on people's lives or their legal or economic status, 89 and whether it has a retroactive effect. 90
When considering factors related to the nature of the rule, courts are
more likely to hold that a rule had substantial impact when it represents

a significant change in the agency's position 9 ' or when the rule is unusually controversial or complex. 92 Furthermore, a court is likely to require
notice and comment procedure if public participation and the creation of
a detailed record would serve a useful purpose. Public input might be
useful if judicial review is likely and a better record is needed, the factual
basis for the rule is dubious, or the agency lacks expertise in the subject
93
matter and has never canvassed it in any public proceedings.
A major shortcoming of the substantial impact test is that it has no
solid foundation in the APA. The exemption from notice and comment
requirements for nonlegislative rules appears to have been written with
the legal effect test, not the substantial impact test, in mind. 94 Further88. Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695 702 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing procedural exceptions); Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 394 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 864-66 (D.
Del. 1970).
89. See Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1979); Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1291-93 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dissent), vacated on
other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112-13
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972). The rule
considered in the Eastern Kentucky case had a peculiarly significant impact on its victims because
there were no legal means by which it could ever be challenged, either before the agency or in court.
See Asimow, supra note 7, at 555-56. Additional examples of substantial impact are provided by
cases considering the publication requirement of APA § 552(a)(1)(D). See Anderson v. Butz, 550
F.2d 459, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1977); Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F.Supp. 652, 659-60 (D.N.M. 1976).
90. See St. Francis Memorial Hosp. v. Weinberger, 413 F. Supp. 323, 329-30 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(disallowing reimbursement of previously incurred debt).
91. See Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1979); Chisholm
v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 394 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976);
Sannon v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 458, 466 (S.D. Fla. 1978); St. Francis Memorial Hosp. v.
Weinberger, 413 F. Supp. 323, 329-30 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307
F. Supp. 858, 864 (D. Del. 1970).
92. See American Bancorp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 509 F.2d 29, 39
(8th Cir. 1974); Sannon v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 458, 466 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
93. See Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 864-65 (D. Del. 1970).
94. See APA Legislative History, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (S. Jud. Comm.
print) (1946) [hereinafter cited as APA Legislative History] (interpretive rules subject to plenary
judicial review while legislative rules involve a maximum of judicial discretion); S. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27, 99-100 (1941) (Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure) ("statements of policy" and "interpretations" rarely published, but "are not
binding on those affected"). Cf A'rORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE APA, supra note 14, at
30 & n.3 (noting that notice and comment requirements apply only to substantive rules, which "have
the force and effect of law").
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more, the practical impact of a rule seems virtually irrelevant in determining whether an agency made new law or explained existing law. 95
Finally, the test cannot be justified by asserting that fairness requires

agencies to provide notice and comment before adopting important nonlegislative rules. 96 After Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natu-

ral Resources Defense Council, Inc.,97 courts cannot, in the interests of
fairness, improved decisionmaking, or facilitation of judicial review, require agencies to go beyond the minimum standards established in the

APA when adopting rules. 98 An agency must decide for itself whether
additional procedures should be employed. 99

In addition to its lack of theoretical support, the substantial impact
test also fails as a judicially manageable standard. Obviously, any litigated rule had a significant impact on someone; otherwise it would not be

worth litigating. Whether that impact is "substantial" is a question to
which no principled answer can be given, because it is impossible to

quantify the variables that courts must address. As a result, judicial decisions under the substantial impact test seem ad hoc and unprincipled-

considerably more so than decisions under the legal effect test. 1°°
Whether a particular rule has a substantial impact will depend upon
impressions and intuitive conclusions. For example, how substantial
must the impact be-just palpable or devastating? 0 1 How frequently
95. See Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (test has continuing vitality as
one of several criteria for evaluating claims of exemption, but useless in distinguishing interpretive
from legislative rules). Many legislative rules have little or no practical impact, and many interpretive rules have significant practical impact. See American Postal Workers Union v.United States

Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1594 (1984). Indeed, rules
made by agencies without delegated legislative power are "necessarily interpretivet,] regardless of
their impact." Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1154 n.26 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
96. But see Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n., 554 F.2d 1140, 1154 n.26 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (courts should not give "binding effect" to interpretive rule, but perhaps "require some sort of
public participation in its issuance in the name of fairness").
97. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
98. Id. at 546-47. See generally Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative
Procedure, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1804 (1978).
99. See Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the substantial impact
test), cert denied, 104 S.Ct. 1591 (1984); Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(substantial impact test does not distinguish legislative from interpretive rules). But see Batterton v.
Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 708-10 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (asserting that substantial impact test survives
Vermont Yankee); 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 7, at § 7.19 (challenging the notion that courts cannot
require agencies to follow procedures not required by the APA).
100. No claim is made that decisions under the legal effect test are always predictable and principled. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
101. According to the House Judiciary Committee, which recommended legislative adoption of
the substantial impact test, the impact must be "palpable and significant" rather than "incidental or
trivial." HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, REGULATORY PROCEDURE Acr op 1982, H.R. REP.No.

435, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1982) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
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must it be felt? To trigger public participation, must the affected class be
the entire regulated group, or a subpart of that group? If the rule is
beneficial to the regulated group, how large a segment of the general
public must be detrimentally affected to make the impact substantial?
What percentage of the class must be negatively affected?10 2 And what
type of interests must be affected-rights, customs, expectations, or
hopes?10 3 The courts have seldom, if ever, seriously addressed these

questions.
Courts applying the substantial impact test tried to decide whether
an opportunity to participate in a new rulemaking process might help
protect the interests of affected members of the public or might assist the
agency to improve the rule. Some, perhaps most, decisions holding that
a rule had a substantial impact seem to have been based on a calculation
that the benefits of participation would outweigh the costs of additional
procedure and of judicial invalidation of an existing rule. 1 4 Unfortunately, few judges are equipped to make more than a wild guess about
such matters.
The unprincipled, ad hoc character of the substantial impact test
renders it nearly useless for predictive purposes. As a result, when formulating a nonlegislative rule that might have some appreciable impact
on someone, a well-counseled agency would always provide notice and
comment. This would be cumbersome, costly, and quite useless in a
great many cases. Vermont Yankee rightly disapproved judicial methodologies that would compel agencies to overproceduralize their
processes.105 And as we shall see, significant increases in the costs of
adopting nonlegislative rules are likely to diminish their flow.106
102. See HoUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 61 (must affect at least a majority of a regulated
group); Note, supra note 31, at 526-529 (indeterminacy of what constitutes significant impact).
103. According to the House Judiciary Committee, a rule would have to affect "substantive
rights or obligations," as opposed to "procedural rights or... mere interests." HousE REPORT,
supra note 101, at 62.
104. See, eg., Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d 984, 987 (9th Cir. 1980); Batterton v.
Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 394 (D.C. Cir.)
(Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976); Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v.
Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1291-92 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Wright, J., dissenting), vacated on other grounds,
426 U.S. 26 (1976); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 864-66 (D. Del. 1970).
105. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 546-47 (1978).
106. See infra notes 111-30 and accompanying text. Although the substantial impact test is not
a defensible guide for the judiciary to use in distinguishing between legislative and nonlegislative
rules or in imposing extra procedures in the interest of fairness, it remains helpful in guiding an
agency decision to provide notice and comment procedure even if not required. See infra notes 20607 and accompanying text.
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RECONSIDERING THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION FOR NONLEGISLATIVE RULES

After observing the judiciary's struggle with the legal effect and substantial impact tests, many observers are tempted to write a solution into
administrative procedure statutes. Why not require that agencies provide notice and comment procedures before adopting most or even all
nonlegislative rules? Indeed, both state and federal reform proposals
would greatly increase the number of nonlegislative rules that could be
adopted only after public participation. 10 7 This section explores the effects on agency behavior of the enactment of such legislation and attempts to test the hypothesis that the public would be better off if it were
enacted. This test requires identification, measurement, and comparison
of the costs and benefits of expanded public participation in the nonlegislative rulemaking process.
A.

Costs and Benefits of Requiring Pre-Adoption Proceduresfor
Nonlegislative Rules.

1. Benefit to the Public From Pre-Adoption Procedure. The
rulemaking procedures of the APA have been widely acclaimed as a brilliant political innovation. The notice and comment procedure, together
with hard-look 0 8 judicial review, addresses our uneasiness with broad
legislative delegations to administrative agencies and with the tenuous
nature of the other legislative and judicial checks on agency behavior.
The APA notice and comment procedure infuses the rulemaking
process with significant elements of openness, accountability, and legitimacy. Public participation promotes fundamental democratic values by
enhancing the responsiveness of agencies to the interest groups affected
by regulation. It opens the process to groups and individuals with discordant points of view who might otherwise not have been heard during
an agency's routine process of consultation with the public. In short,
through advance notice and comment, every constituency has an opportunity to participate in a meaningful manner in making the laws that will
affect it.
The requirement that agencies invite and give consideration to public comments broadens an agency's perspective, which otherwise might
not extend beyond the views of the staff or the client groups with whom
107. See infra notes 132-204 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, these proposals will do
little to solve the characterization problem, because they maintain a zone within which an agency
can adopt rules without notice and comment. Patrolling the borders of this zone will be no less
difficult than doing so under present law. See infra notes 156-59, 170-72, 184-203 and accompanying
text.
108. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

Vol. 1985:381]

NONLEGISLA TIVE R ULEMAKING

the staff regularly consults. An invitation to submit comments stimulates
outsiders to furnish data and other inputs, providing a source of low-cost

information to agency decisionmakers. A rule is likely to be a better
product if its drafters must consider seriously alternatives that they

might have overlooked or take account of practical problems that otherwise would crop up only after a rule goes into effect. In addition, an
agency may receive more cooperation and less obstruction from regulated interests that have had a hand in shaping the rules within which
they must function.10 9 Finally, by generating a record of public comment and agency response, the notice and comment system facilitates
pre-enforcement hard-look judicial review, an important check on factually unsupported or arbitrary regulation.
In some respects, the advantages of notice and comment rulemaking
apply equally to legislative and nonlegislative rulemaking. Members of
interest groups affected by nonlegislative rules would certainly utilize and
probably benefit from an advance opportunity to influence an agency
concerning the desirability and the content of such rules. 110 Pre-adoption notice and comment would be a useful supplement to the channels of
influence already available, such as informal consultation with the staff
and post-adoption critiques and modification petitions.
Realistically, however, few nonlegislative rules have the practical
significance of the great bulk of legislative rules. The vast majority of
nonlegislative rules are insignificant, of primarily internal importance to
the agency, or indisputably valid. An invitation to comment in such
cases would produce no response or, at most, a trivial pro forma response
from people paid to keep track of agency activity.
2. Costs of Rulemaking Procedure. Although notice and comment rulemaking procedures have a great many benefits, they are not
cost-free. Indeed, the rulemaking process can be both ponderous and
costly."' To produce any new rule, whether legislative or nonlegislative,
an agency must incur the substantial bureaucratic costs of overcoming
inertia. The internal process includes research, resolution of staff con109. See E. BARDACH &; R. KAGAN, supra note 34, at 178-81. But see Achterman & Fairfax,
The Public ParticipationRequirements of the FederalLand Policy & Management Act, 21 ARIZ. L.
REv. 501, 508 (1979) ("there is no reason to assume that the opportunity to participate leads to
more readily accepted decisions. Public involvement programs. . . may easily mobilize dissent").
110. Under present practice, agencies frequently invite public comments before making important nonlegislative rules. Often the public participation is enthusiastic. For example, there is extensive participation in the making of IRS interpretive rules and FCC policy statements.
11. See, eg., E. BARDACH & IL KAGAN, supra note 34, at 193-95 (1982); Schuck, When the
Exception Becomes the Rule, 1984 DUKE L.J. 163, 194-96; Cooper, Regulatory Reform? 35 FoOD
DRUG. CosM. L.J. 183, 199-202 (1980).
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flicts, informal consultation with interested outsiders, agreement upon
precise language, consensus-building, and multilevel review. The finanan agency on the
cial and psychological costs of forging consensus within
11 2
substantial.
quite
be
may
rule
new
contents of a
If public participation is legally required, or if the agency chooses
voluntarily to provide it, the agency must then publish a notice of its
proposal in the FederalRegister and mail notice to persons known to be
interested. The public process continues through the receipt of comments (typically with time extensions to accommodate commentators
who wish to perform studies), public hearings (which are not required
but often provided), staff analysis of the comments, preparation of a reasoned statement of basis and purpose, and prepublication in the Federal
Register.113 The final act takes place in the courts when the rule is subjected to pre-enforcement judicial review.
By general consensus, it usually takes between six and twelve
months to push an uncontroversial rule through notice and comment
procedure unless unusual steps are taken to accelerate the process. If a
rule is controversial, or if an outsider or factions within the agency have
an interest in delaying its adoption, a much longer delay is likely. During the rulemaking period, regulated entities remain uncertain about the
ultimate course of regulation and thus are inhibited from making plans.
Moreover, during this period, the regulatory program cannot operate
with full effectiveness. As a result, whatever benefits are supposed to
accrue from a particular rule are deferred.
3. An Economic Model of Bureaucratic Choice. Agency decisionmakers, like all rational beings, seek to function efficiently by maximizing utility-both their own and that of the regulatory program for
which they are responsible. Given a fixed budget and many competing
uses of available resources, efficient operation involves a constant weighing of the net marginal costs and benefits of a proposed course of action.
Thus, in order to undertake a new legislative or nonlegislative rulemaking project, an agency must conclude that the net marginal benefits to the
regulatory program or to the agency from adopting an incremental rule
outweigh the net marginal bureaucratic costs of adopting it. 114
112. See A. DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 178-82; Diver, supra note 30, at 73, 75 (discussing
social costs of rulemaking). Of course, an agency's costs include not only expenditures on staff and
other out-of-pocket expenses but also the foregone opportunities to produce other valuable outputs.
113. Proposed regulatory reform laws would add additional steps. For example, they frequently
require more explanatory material in the notice, public hearings, cross examination, regulatory analyses, or strict deadlines. See, eg., S. 1080, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. §§ 2-3.
114. See A. DowNs, supra note 112, at 195-96; H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 122,
172-97 (3d ed. 1976); B. MrrNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 132-38 (1980);
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In other words, there must exist a supply curve of bureaucratic outputs; increasing the net costs of producing any particular output will usually diminish the supply of that particular output. Given an increase in
cost of producing one type of product, an agency might decide to produce the same number of units and cut some other output or program.
Alternatively the agency might rationally decide to use its limited resources to produce some other category of output or take advantage of
some other opportunity. More typically, however, the agency would decide to produce fewer units of the more costly output while keeping the
proportion of the budget allocated to it the same.1 15
While the slope of the supply curve will vary from one agency to
another, it seems likely that the supply of nonlegislative rules is quite
sensitive to increases in bureaucratic production costs. Interpretive rules
and policy statements are different from other bureaucratic outputs in
one critical respect: a regulatory program can function without them.
Legislative rules are often necessary to set a regulatory program in motion. However, the purpose of nonlegislative rules is to diminish uncertainty. For the most part, the costs of uncertainty are borne by members
of the public, not by the agency. For that reason, uncertainty is an exter116
nality that agency utility-maximizers need not take into account.
Thus an agency may well choose to muddle through without producing
any guidance documents, or it may choose to transmit any necessary guidance to its staff through informal intra-agency memoranda, hallway
conversations, or other subformal communications. It may feel little or
no compulsion to issue a steady flow of publicly available nonlegislative
117
rules.
Of course, a new interpretation or policy may improve administration or raise the level of compliance, but these are long-term considerations; in the short term, an agency can get along without them. Given a
choice of how to deploy scarce internal resources, an agency might deDiver, supra note 30, at 72-76; Gifford, supra note 35, at 125-35; Gifford, supra note 28, at 18-19;
Rabin, Agency CriminalReferralsin the FederalSystem: An EmpiricalStudy of ProsecutoialDiscretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1045-52 (1972).
115. Cf Scanlon & Rogowsky, Back-doorRulemaking: A View from the CPSC, REG. July-Aug.
1984, at 27-28 (substitution of adjudication for costly rulemaking).
116. See Diver, supra note 30, at 102-03 (confusion and evasion generated by regulatory vague-

ness burdens public far more than regulator).
117. Cf American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. O'Connor, 747 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
American Federationheld that advisory opinions of the special counsel of the Merit Systems Protection Board concerning applications of the Hatch Act are not ripe for pre-enforcement judicial review. Id. at 752-57. The court stated that immediate review of the opinions would discourage their
issuance in light of the severe budgetary constraints under which the special counsel operates. Id. at
754. Dissenting, Judge Mikva contended that judicial review would not chill the rulings process

since issuance of rulings is the most efficient way to prevent disputes. Id. at 760.
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cide that it is more important to issue legislative rules, conclude pending
adjudications, investigate misconduct, answer urgent requests for advice,
or prepare congressional testimony. Nonlegislative rules can usually be
deferred until additional resources become available. Thus they must
often be losers in the unending internal struggle for resources.
Moreover, there may be staff opposition to a proposed nonlegislative
rule: some will argue that it outlines possible paths of evasion, that it is
over- or under-inclusive, that it will induce undue rigidity, or that it will
strip staff members of their influence and power by making public the
secret law they have applied.1 18 Thus, to personnel who must decide
whether to adopt a new nonlegislative rule, the net regulatory benefit
may seem negligible and the net costs, exclusive of the costs of public
procedure, may seem substantial.
A decision to put off rulemaking is much more likely to occur if the
law requires additional steps, like notice and comment procedure, to be
taken before the rule can be adopted. These procedures divert busy people from tasks that may seem to have a higher priority and impose significant internal communication and other bureaucratic costs. As a result,
requirements of notice and comment will shift the supply curve for nonlegislative rules to the left; given a constant demand for this particular
bureaucratic output, fewer will be produced. To express the same
thought another way, the level of utility that an agency requires of an
incremental nonlegislative rule at the margin must rise if the internal
costs of adopting it are increased. Thus, requiring agencies to conduct
notice and comment procedure surely would discourage the adoption of
at least some marginal nonlegislative rules.
There is some scattered empirical evidence to support the proposition that the supply of nonlegislative rules is quite sensitive to the bureaucratic costs of adopting them. First, this theme emerged again and
again in the course of interviews that the author conducted in many
agencies about the nonlegislative rulemaking process. 1 9 Although such
statements should be discounted somewhat as the predictable responses
of agency staff members who do not wish to be bothered with any new
controls, the author is convinced that the problem is very real.
118. See Diver, supra note 30, at 94-95 (discussing the withdrawal by INS of proposed policy
statement because of internal opposition to constraining discretion).
119. This interviewing provided the empirical base for Asimow, supra note 7. This concern was
expressed in interviews with personnel at OSHA, IRS, SEC, FDA, FTC, FCC, and the Wage and

Hour Division of the Department of Labor (memoranda of interviews are on file with the author).
See also letters from HEW (Feb. 11, 1977) and Treasury (Aug. 12, 1976) to Robert Anthony, Chair
of the Administrative Conference (additional procedural steps will discourage nonlegislative

rulemaking).
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For example, between 1974 and 1984, the number of published Internal Revenue Service (IRS) revenue rulings declined steadily from 626
to 179 per year. 120 There are several reasons for this precipitous decline.
Both the IRS and the Treasury Department (which reviews all published
rulings) recognized that the process of putting out rulings is costly and
should be reserved for significant interpretations.1 2 1 In addition, the IRS
and the Treasury Department instituted more careful review of proposed
new rulings. In the absence of prodding by management to cut the backlog, the review commitment led to bottlenecks and delays as hundreds of
rulings piled up on the desks of very busy people. Both the delays and
the nit-picking reviews discouraged ruling writers who sought other,
more rewarding assignments. Finally, the personnel who produce or review revenue rulings have frequently been diverted to other, more urgent
tasks. Both the IRS and the Treasury Department have been deluged
with the tasks of preparing testimony and promulgating regulations to
implement the constant flow of new tax legislation. In addition, substantial resources have been diverted to discharging the responsibility of the
IRS to sanitize and publicize its private letter rulings.1 22
The IRS experience illustrates that the output of nonlegislative rules
responds to insertion of new procedural hurdles, such as additional reviews, into the production process. It also shows that an agency can
easily redeploy its resources from producing nonlegislative rules in favor
of higher priority tasks. Because the IRS can function quite well without
producing any revenue rulings at all-it can leave the public in the dark
or it can respond to requests for advice with private letter rulings-the
public ruling process is a certain loser in the struggle for resources.
In California, judicial and legislative innovations have provided evidence about the effects of increasing the costs of issuing nonlegislative
rules. 123 In 1978, the California Supreme Court held in Armistead v.
State PersonnelBoard,124 that nonlegislative rules could not be adopted
without prior notice and comment. Most agencies largely ignored the
decision. A few tried to comply but encountered considerable difficulty
in deciding which rules were covered. Some agencies apparently decided
120. See 1974-1 & 2 C.B. (reporting 626 decisions); 1984-1 & 2 C.B. (reporting 179 decisions).
121. The material on IRS and Treasury decisionmaking is based on interviews with present and
former IRS and Treasury personnel. Copies of these interviews are on file with the author.
122. See I.R.C. § 6110(a) (1982) (requiring the Secretary to open any written determination to
public inspection).
123. The material on California rulemaking is drawn from interviews with personnel in agencies,
the Attorney General's office, and present and former staff members of the Office of Administrative
Law (copies of these interviews are on fie with the author).
124. 22 Cal. 3d 198, 201-03, 583 P.2d 744, 74547, 149 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2-3 (1978).
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not to adopt revisions to staff manuals or other nonlegislative rules because of the costs of complying with Armistead.
In 1982 and 1983, the California legislature explicitly amended its
APA to require notice and comment before the adoption of both legislative and nonlegislative rules. 125 The statute also required approval of the
rules by the Office of Administrative Law (OAL),126 and empowered the
OAL to issue determinations that nonlegislative rules had been improperly adopted.1 27 An exception was made for tax agencies, which had
1 28
found it unduly expensive to comply with Armistead.
This legislation has produced a great deal of confusion. Many agencies have ignored the requirements, apparently hoping that failure to
comply will have no negative consequences. Others have complied with
the requirements but issued fewer nonlegislative rules. The OAL is uncertain how to implement the statute and how its limited resources can
be stretched to cover the new burden of supervising the nonlegislative
1 29
rulemaking process.
No final conclusions can yet be drawn from the California experience. Agencies and the OAL may accommodate themselves to the new
law and produce a steady flow of rules adopted after appropriate public
involvement. So far, however, the results are largely negative.
4. Balancing the Costs and Benefits. Nonlegislative rules are
enormously important to members of the public who must live with regulation. Any significant diminution in the flow of interpretive rules or
policy statements disserves the public interest.
Interpretive rules, for example, serve a number of vital purposes.
Unless an interpretation is embodied in a legislative rule, a nonlegislative
interpretation is superior to other techniques. Interpretive rules are more
accessible, more reliable, and, because of their generalized form, much
more useful than interpretation supplied through formal or informal adjudication or advice letters.
For similar reasons, the public has an important stake in encouraging an agency to structure its discretionary powers through the adoption
of nonlegislative policy statements. A published policy statement is
125. Cal. Gov't. Code § 11,347.5 (West Supp. 1985).
126. See id at § 11,349.1. For an excellent analysis of the unique powers of the California Office
of Administrative Law, see Cohen, Regulatory Reform: Assessing the CaliforniaPlan, 1983 DuxE
L.J. 231.
127. See Cal. Gov't. Code at § 11,347.5.
128. Id. at § 11,342(b).
129. Letter from Director of Office of Administrative Law to State Regulatory Agencies, May
11, 1983. For example, requests have been made that the office determine what portion of hundreds
of volumes of staff manuals come under the notice and comment requirements of the law.
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much more useful than the same material tucked admidst the trivia in a
staff manual, embedded in particularized decisions in formal or informal
adjudications, or simply derived from the practices of the staff.
Given the importance of nonlegislative rules, should full-fledged notice and comment procedure be required before they are adopted? In
1946, the drafters of the APA concluded that the benefits of mandatory
public procedure were outweighed by the issuance of fewer rules and by
1 30
reduced effectiveness, increased cost, and undue delay.
1 31
This article concludes that their call was close but right.
Mandatory pre-adoption procedure would be a significant disincentive to
nonlegislative rulemaking. The public would lose more than it would
gain. The loss of a large quantity of relatively umimportant nonlegislative material outweighs the benefits of providing a relatively small
number of people additional opportunities to influence the content of a
relatively small number of important rules.
Many proponents of regulatory reform disagree with this conclusion. The next section analyzes these reform proposals and concludes
that the post-adoption proposal of the Administrative Conference is a
preferable solution.
130. See Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (APA
exceptions designed to "accommodate situations where the policies promoted by public participation
in rulemaking are outweighed by the countervailing considerations of effectiveness, efficiency, expe-

dition and reduction in expense").
Concern that mandatory procedure would discourage nonlegislative rulemaking was the first of
several reasons for the exemption. See APA Legislative History, supra note 94, at 18. The Judiciary
Committee staff wrote:
First, it is desired to encourage the making of such rules. Secondly, those types of rules
vary so greatly in their contents and the occasion for their issuance that it seems wise to
leave the matter of notice and public procedures to the discretion of the agencies concerned. Thirdly, the provision for petitions contained in subsection (c) affords an opportunity for private parties to secure a reconsideration of such rules when issued. Another
reason, which might be added, is that "interpretative" rules-as merely interpretations of
statutory provisions-are subject to plenary judicial review, whereas "substantive" rules
involve a maximum of administrative discretion.
131. For earlier statements of reservations about expanding the scope of public participation in
the adoption of nonlegislative rules, see Auerbach, Administrative Rulemaking in Minnesota, 63
MINN. L. REv. 151, 158-60 (1979); ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: HEARINGS BEFORE THE
SUBCOMM. ON ADMINI-rRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE

89th Cong., 1st Sess. 138, 150, 174 (1965) (statement of Kenneth C. Davis). For discussion of the adverse effects of a poorly conceived expansion of public participation, see Achterman &
Fairfax, supra note 109.
JUDICIARY,
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STATE AND FEDERAL REFORM PROPOSALS

Nonlegislative Rules and the 1981 Model State Administrative
ProcedureAct.

1. Provisionsof the Revised Act. The original Model State APA,
which was first approved in 1946 and revised in 1961,132 contained no
special provision for nonlegislative rules. The Act's broad definition of

"rule" and comprehensive provisions for notice and comment
134
peared to cover both legislative and nonlegislative rules.

33

ap-

However, the Act's requirement of notice and comment for nonleg-

islative rules was implicit, not clear-cut, and could be ignored on a variety of pretexts. 135 As a result, state agencies generally adopted
interpretations and policy statements without any advance procedures
and were seldom corrected by courts.' 36 In a minority of states, how-

ever, court decisions invalidated nonlegislative rules adopted without in37
viting public comment or filed without following required procedures.'
In 1981, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
132. See MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 14 U.L.A. 357, 359 (1980).
133. 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 2, at § 1(7) defines "rule" as "each agency statement of
The term ingeneral applicability that implements, interprets, or proscribes law or policy ....
cludes the amendment or repeal of a prior rule but does not include ... (C) intra-agency memoranda." Section 3 of the Act provides for notice and comment rulemaking "[p]rior to the adoption,
amendment or repeal of any rule. .. ."
134. See F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 185-87 (1965).
135. For example, the definition of "rule" could be understood to refer only to legislative rules,
or nonlegislative rules could be classified as exempt "intra-agency memoranda." See also
Frolmmayer, The Oregon AdministrativeProcedureAct: An Essay on StateAdministrative Rulemaking Procedure Reform, 58 OR. L. REV. 411, 428-39 (1980) (discussing the meaning of "rule" and
exceptions to the definition under the Oregon APA).
136. 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 10, at § 3-109 comment.
137. California courts were particularly active. See Armistead v. State Personnel Bd., 22 Cal. 3d
198, 201-03, 583 P.2d 744, 745-47, 149 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2-3 (1978) (interpretive rules buried in staff
manual invalid for want of prior notice and comment). See also Goleta Valley Community Hosp. v.
State Dep't. of Health Serv., 149 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 197 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1983) (procedurally faulty
interpretation held invalid); Ligon v. State Personnel Bd., 123 Cal. App. 3d 583, 587-88, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 717, 719 (1981) (where APA not complied with, court refuses to give any weight to agency
policy even as administrative interpretation). The holding in Armistead was codified at Cal. Gov't.
Code § 11347.5 (West Supp. 1985), requiring agencies to provide notice and comment before adopting any "guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual, instruction, order, standard of general application, or
other rule. . . ." See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
For cases from other states, see Cheshire Convalescent Center Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals
and Health Care, 386 A.2d 264, 274 (Conn. C.P. 1977) (guidelines for nursing home construction);
District of Columbia v. Green, 310 A.2d 848, 854 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973) (interpretive rule concerning
property tax); McKee v. Likens, 261 N.W.2d 566, 577-78 (Minn. 1977) (taxpayer may sue to enjoin
use of public funds under policy adopted without APA compliance); State v. Van Wie, 382 A.2d 372,
374-75 (N.H. 1978) (filing of manual on administering breathalyzer tests substantially complied with
APA filing requirements); Schoolway Transp. Co. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 72 Wis. 2d 223,
232-37, 240 N.W.2d 403, 408-10 (1976).
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139
State Laws proposed a new Model State APA. 138 In addition to notice
14 0 the new Act's rulemaking procedures also reand written comment,
quire the issuance of a concise explanatory statement1 41 and the maintenance of a rulemaking record. 142 Furthermore, the new Model Act goes
beyond other administrative procedure statutes to require, under certain
circumstances, oral hearings 14 3 and the preparation of a detailed costbenefit analysis. 44 If the process is not completed within a 180-day pe145
riod, it must begin anew.
Although the Act exempts nonlegislative rules from certain
rulemaking procedures, the exemptions are narrowly drafted. For example, an agency may dispense with notice and comment 46 "in the adoption of a rule that only defines the meaning of a statute or other provision
of law or precedent if the agency does not possess delegated authority to
bind the courts to any extent with its definition."' 47 If an agency chooses
to omit notice and comment, the published rule must include a statement
to that effect, 148 and a reviewing court is instructed to "determine wholly
de novo the validity" of the rule.149
The exception for policy statements is equally narrow.' 50 An
agency need not employ notice and comment procedures before adopting
151
a rule that establishes "criteria or guidelines" to be used by the staff.
However, the exception covers only criteria or guidelines relating to
"performing audits, investigations, or inspections, settling commercial
disputes, negotiating commercial arrangements, or in the defense, prose138. See 1981 MODEL Acr, supra note 10.
139. See id. at § 3-103.
140. See id. at § 3-104(a).
141. See id. at § 3-110.
142. See id. at § 3-112.
143. See id. at § 3-104(b).
144. See id. at § 3-105.
145. See id. at § 3-106.
146. The Act does not permit the agency to dispense with publishing a concise explanatory
statement, maintaining a rulemaking record, filing the rule with the secretary of state, or allowing a
30-day pre-effective period. See id at §§ 3-110(a), 3-112, 3-114, 3-115. These requirements alone
will invalidate many rules. See, eg., Sturman v. Ingraham, 383 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (App. Div. 1976)
("program" giving criteria for hospital construction not filed with state cannot be applied).
147. 1981 MODEL Acr, supra note 10, at § 3-109(a) (emphasis added).
148. Id.
149. Id. at § 3-109(b).
150. The new Act also exempts from required rulemaking procedure "a rule concerning only the
internal management of an agency which does not directly and substantially affect the procedural or
substantive rights or duties of any segment of the public[.]" Id. at § 3-116(1). It would seem that
this exemption would cover only rules of strictly internal impact. See 1961 MODEL Acr, supranote
2, at § 1(7); Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative ProcedureAct" Background, Construction,Applicability, Public Access to Agency Law, the Rulemaking Proces, 60 IowA L. REV. 731, 833-34 (1975).
151. 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 10, at § 3-116(2).
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cution or settlement of cases." 15 2 Finally, the exception applies only "if
disclosure of the criteria or guidelines would: (i) enable law violators to
avoid detection; (ii) facilitate disregard of requirements imposed by law;
or (iii) give a clearly improper advantage to persons who are in an ad1 53
verse position to the state."
The commissioners were clearly impressed by the need for pre-adoption procedures for nonlegislative rules and by the fact that many state
agencies had ignored the requirements of prior law.15 4 In addition, they
were undoubtedly influenced by federal cases spelling out the substantial
155
impact doctrine.
2. Analysis of the Revised Model Act.
a. The delegatedpower criterion. Under section 3-109(a), whether
an agency can adopt an interpretive rule without pre-adoption procedure
turns upon a construction of the agency's rulemaking power. This proposal has the striking advantage of solving the nagging definitional
problems: If an agency has delegated rulemaking power, it must employ
notice and comment procedure. Unfortunately, however, in solving one
problem, the draftsmen of the 1981 Act have saddled agencies and courts
with a new and possibly even more onerous burden: construction of the
scope of delegated rulemaking power.
Many regulatory statutes contain a general rulemaking power, such
as a provision allowing an agency to adopt such rules and regulations as
are required to implement the statute. This language might or might not
be construed to provide an agency with delegated power to adopt a particular interpretation. Under the influence of some modern federal
cases, 156 a state court could easily decide that a general rulemaking provision of this type provides an agency with the power to adopt binding
legislative rules.15 7 On the other hand, a state court could also construe a
152. Id.

153. Id.
154. The Commissioners "bracketed" section 3-109 (the grudging exception for interpretive

rules), so that a state can justifiably omit the provision. See id. at § 3-109 comment. Similarly, the
Comment to section 3-116, the narrow exception for policy statements, suggests that states should
consider an additional provision requiring advance notice and comment procedure "to the extent it
is practicable." Id. at § 3-116 comment.
155. See supra notes 78-106 and accompanying text. The Comment to section 3-109 refers to the

substantial impact of interpretive rules as one justification for entirely omitting any exception to the
procedural requirements. See 1981 MODEL Acr, supra note 10, at § 3-109 comment.
156. See, eg., National Nutritional Foods Ass'n. v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 695-97 (2d Cir.),
cerL denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FrC, 482 F.2d 672, 697-98
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). See also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
303-12 (1979) (search for inexplicit sources of delegated legislative power).
157. See, e-g., Megdal v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 288 Ore. 293, 320-21, 605 P.2d
273, 287 (1979) (board must adopt legislative rules under its general rulemaking power).
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general rulemaking power to permit an agency to adopt only procedural
or nonlegislative rules. 158 In all likelihood, there will be no judicial deci-

sions that clarify the scope of an agency's rulemaking power.
Section 3-109(a) seems seriously misdirected. Why should a proce-

dural distinction be drawn between agencies that do and those that do
not have legislative power to adopt their interpretations? Why should
agencies be forced to speculate about whether they have delegated power
to adopt rules even though they do not wish to use the power? Why
should notice and comment procedures be required before adoption of a

rule that has a trivial impact and is purely nonlegislative? 15 9 Why should
courts be compelled to grapple with the difficult and utterly irrelevant

issue of the scope of a general rulemaking power when the agency disclaims its use?
b.

The elimination of deference. Section 3-109(b) instructs a

court to "determine wholly de novo the validity of a rule" adopted without notice and comment procedures. The effect of this provision is to
preclude a court from deferring to many interpretive rules.160 It is similar

to the proposed Bumpers Amendment to the federal APA, 161 which has
158. This issue is generally obscured in state administrative law decisions. But see Morgan v.
Stimson Lumber Co., 607 P.2d 150, 154 (Ore. 1980); State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina
Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 568-69 (N.C. 1980).
159. Section 3-108 of the 1981 Act contains a "good cause" exemption similar to that in APA
§ 553(b) (B). It permits immediate adoption of a rule when notice and comment procedure would be
"unnecessary, impractical, or contrary to the public interest." See 1981 MODEL Acr, supra note 10,
at § 3-108(a). The agency has the burden of establishing entitlement to the exemption. Id. at § 3108(b). Under this exemption, agencies can dispense with superfluous procedure before adopting
trivial nonlegislative rules. However, the courts have been strict in applying the corresponding provision of the federal APA. See, eg., Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 184 (1st Cir. 1983) (good
cause exception "is narrowly construed"). See generally Jordan, supra note 81, at 129-35.
In a comment to section 3-108, the Commissioners express the hope that the "shifted burden of
persuasion" required by section 3-108(b) will "make abuse of this exemptive provision infrequent
because the consequences facing an agency if it guesses incorrectly are too serious to justify the risk
of using the exemption in close or unclear cases." 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 10, at § 3-108
comment. Consequently, an agency in doubt about whether public procedure is "unnecessary" must
err on the side of providing for it.
160. "A reviewing court shall determine wholly de novo the validity of a rule within the scope of
subsection (a) that is adopted without complying with the provisions of Sections 3-103 through 3108." 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 10, at § 3-109(b).
161. The Bumpers Amendment is included as section 5 of S.1080, which was unenacted regulatory reform legislation. Section 5 was intended to amend 5 U.S.C. § 706 (§ 10(e) of the APA).
S. 1080, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. § 5, 128 CONG. REc. S2717 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982). See generally
Levin, Review of "Jurisdictional"Issues under the Bumpers Amendment, 1983 DUKE L.J. 355;
O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study ofImpacts of the Bumpers JudicialReview Amendment, 49 U. CINN. L. REv. 739 (1980). In the version of the Bumpers Amendment embodied in S.
1080, courts would be required to decide questions of law "independently." S.1080, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 5, 128 CONG. REC. S2717 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)). They
could not rely upon "any presumption in favor of or against agency action." Id. at S2718 (amending
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been opposed both by scholars 162 and by the Administrative Conference
1 63
of the United States.
There are several reasons why state courts should be permitted to

establish rebuttable presumptions in favor of agency legal interpretations,
especially those embodied in nonlegislative rules. 164 In many situations,
deference to administrative legal interpretations is appropriate beyond
any reasonable doubt. For example, suppose an agency announces an
interpretation of language contained in a previously adopted legislative

rule relating to a technical provision in the underlying statute. The staff
justifiably claims expertise in the particular administrative problem. The
interpretation appears carefully reasoned and does not involve a sudden

reversal of prior policy. In such a case, judicial deference to the interpretation is not only justified, it is inevitable.
Furthermore, de novo review of issues of law encourages litigants to
seek judicial review of interpretations with which they disagree. With
the presumption in force, a party will not appeal unless it can develop
persuasive arguments that an interpretation is invalid.
Moreover, deference is an essential element of the relationship between agencies and reviewing courts. It expresses the same common
sense notions of comparative qualifications as the substantial evidence

test,1 65 the classification of most mixed questions of law and fact as questions of fact,1 66 and the narrow scope of review accorded to courts that

review agency discretionary actions or determinations of policy.' 67 Legislatures intended to let agencies make these decisions; they did not intend that the courts would frequently interpose their own judgment. 168
5 U.S.C. § 706(c)). Instead, "the court shall give the agency interpretation such weight as it warrants, taking into account the discretionary authority provided to the agency by law." Id.
162. See, eg., McGowan, Congress, Court and Control of DelegatedPower, 77 COLUM. L. REv.
1119, 1162-68 (1977); Pierce & Shapiro, Politicaland JudicialReview ofAgency Action, 59 TEx. L.
REv. 1175, 1189-95 (1981); Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: JudicialReview ofAgency
Action, 31 AD. L. REv. 329, 329-44 (1979). But see Kennedy, The Bumpers Amendment: Regulating
the Regulators, 67 A.B.A. J. 1639, 1641 (1981) (arguing that Bumpers Amendment is necessary to
assure that agencies comply with congressional intent).
163. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.79-6 (1984) (recommending that the Bumpers Amendment not be
enacted).
164. State courts frequently defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes or rules. See
1961 MODEL Acr, supra note 2, at 495-96 (1980), 220-21 (1984 Supp.); F. COOPER, supra note 134,
at 265 n.100, 266, 267-68. But see Brodie & Linde, State Court Review of Administrative Action:
Prescribing the Scope of Review, 1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 537, 546 ("state courts probably take for
granted that the correct interpretation and application of terms used in the statute, rule, standard, or
concept fall within their province").
165. See eg., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
166. See, eg., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
167. See eg., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
168. See Chevron, Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782-83 (1984)
(court must defer to reasonable interpretation when Congress implicitly delegates to agency);
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Nevertheless, the 1981 Model Act precludes a court from giving defer-

ence where an agency properly adopts an interpretation without preadoption procedure, regardless of the insignificance of the interpretation,
169
its obvious correctness, or the irrelevance of pre-adoption procedure.

c. The policy statement exemption.

Section 3-116(2) of the Model

Act provides that agencies can adopt policy statements without notice

and comment if disclosure of agency guidelines and criteria would obstruct law enforcement or give an improper advantage to persons adverse
to the state.1 70 However, courts cannot easily determine the effects of
disclosure. Publicity of tax audit guidelines would obviously "facilitate
disregard of requirements imposed by law," 17 1 but it is unlikely that

other typical policy statements could so easily meet these standards. One
can imagine lengthy and expensive trials devoted to resolving whether
someone with knowledge of agency guidelines might avoid detection or
obtain a clearly improper advantage in dealing with the state. As a result, a vast quantity of guidelines, priority settings, staff manuals and

bulletins, and similar discretion-limiting material could not be issued
72
without prior public participation.1

Furthermore, during the transition period, most agencies will not
yet have provided for public involvement before routinely issuing the sort
of material now contained in news releases, letters, administrative manuals, or staff bulletins. Because agency action based on an invalidly
adopted policy statement is of dubious validity,' 73 section 3-116(2) may
Coffman, JudicialReview ofAdministrative InterpretationofStatutes, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 33
(1983); Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 33 (1983) ("the
judicial duty is to ensure that the administrative agency stays within the zone of discretion committed to it by its organic act"). But see Byse, Scope ofJudicialReview in InformalRulemaking 33 AD.
L. R v. 183, 190-93 (1981) (it is inconsistent with our basic political and governmental theory for
courts to hold that the agency's interpretation will be controlling so long as that interpretation is

reasonable).
169. Under the "good cause" exemption of section 3-108(a), pre-adoption procedure could be
omitted in cases of obviously trivial rules, and a court would not be required to review the rule de
novo. However, this provision is narrowly drawn and an agency could not rely upon it in doubtful
cases. See supra note 159.
170. 1981 MODEL AcT, supra note 10, at § 3-116(2).
171. See id.

172. For discussion of the precursor of this provision in the Iowa statute, see Bonfield, supra
note 150, at 787-91, 839. Bonfield notes that this provision is "bristling with qualifications" and is
"very narrowly drafted." Id. at 787.
173. The new Model Act provides that a rule adopted without substantial compliance with the
procedural provisions of the act is invalid. 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 10, at § 3-113(a). See
Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm'n v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 920-22 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (adjudication can stand despite reliance on invalidly adopted rule because result in adjudication not dictated; agency bound by procedures set forth in the invalid rule); State v. Van Wie, 382 A.2d 372,
374-75 (N.H. 1978) (if breathalyzer manual had not been fied in "substantial compliance" with state
law, the drunk driving law would have been unenforceable).
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enable persons threatened by sanctions for violation of licensing or other
regulatory laws to avoid enforcement.
d. Effect of the required rulemakingprovisions. A broadened requirement of pre-adoption procedure will impose additional bureaucratic
174
costs on agencies, discouraging the adoption of nonlegislative rules.
The publication of fewer nonlegislative rules will result in poorer administration and less guidance to the public. Although a Comment to the
new Model Act articulates this concern,' 7 5 it fails to explain how the Act
is responsive to the problem.
The new Model Act does contain several provisions that may help
counteract the negative effects of increased pre-adoption procedures.
Section 2-104(3) requires an agency to "adopt rules, in addition to those
otherwise required by this Act, embodying appropriate standards, principles, and procedural safeguards that the agency will apply to the law it
administers."' 176 Likewise, section 2-104(4) requires an agency to "adopt
rules to supersede principles of law or policy lawfully declared by the
agency as the basis for its decisions in particular cases."' 177 To the extent
these provisions are enforceable, an agency would no longer be free to
bypass rulemaking techniques. Instead, as its "standards" or "principles" evolved through administration or adjudication, it would be com78
pelled to express them in the form of legislative or nonlegislative rules.1
Sections 2-104(3) and (4) may ameliorate the negative effects of
more stringent pre-adoption procedures. However, rulemaking is not required under either subsection until it is "feasible," and then only "to the
extent practicable." 179 Courts are likely to defer to an agency determination that a "standard" or "principle" is still evolving, or that codification
174. See supra notes 114-31 and accompanying text.

175. See 1981 MODEL Acr, supra note 10, at § 3-109 comment. The Comment reflects the
personal views of Professor Bonfield, who drafted this portion of the 1981 Act and would have

preferred no pre-adoption procedures for nonlegislative rules. Telephone conversation with Arthur
Bonfield, July 25, 1984.
176. 1981 MODEL Ac, supra note 10, at § 2-104(3). See Bonfield, State Law in the Teaching of

Administrative Law, 61 Tax. L. REV. 95, 104-08 (1982).
177. 1981 MODEL Aar, supra note 10, at § 2-104(4).
178. The Commissioners point out that policymaking by rule has several advantages, including
the "greater ease of public access to law embodied in widely disseminated published rules as com-

pared to law embodied in unpublished orders which are only available in the agency's office for
public inspection." Id. at § 2-104 comment. The Commissioners further acknowledge that "[o]nly
by the enactment of a statutory provision of the type recommended here. . . can agencies be forced
to codify in rules principles of law or policy. . . . Without such a provision they will be free, in

many situations, to make their most controversial policies on a case-by-case basis in adjudications
.

...Id.

179. See idat §§ 2-104(3) and (4).
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is inappropriate. 180 Moreover, it is far from clear whether sufficient enforcement resources will be available. While the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches struggle to enforce sections 2-104(3) and (4),18' the
new requirements for adoption of nonlegislative rules will exert their substantial negative effects. How much more effective sections 2-104(3) and
(4) would have been if they were not accompanied by provisions requiring agencies to incur substantial costs in implementing them through
adoption of nonlegislative rules.
B.

CongressionalProposals.

Regulatory reform legislation was approved by the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate during the 97th Congress. Both bills
contained versions of the substantial impact test. Although the Senate
bill passed unanimously, 182 the House bill never came to a vote. Similar
legislation was introduced in the 98th Congress, 83 but to date no substantial progress has been made.
The House bill, H.R. 746, required notice and comment procedure if
a nonlegislative rule "has general applicability and would have a substantial impact on substantive rights or obligations of persons outside the
agency and otherwise has the effect of a substantive rule."' 184 The House
Judiciary Committee report clearly articulated the theoretical difference
between legislative and nonlegislative rules and observed that an agency
should have the choice whether or not to make use of its delegated
power. 185 The report pointed out, however, that nonlegislative rules occasionally have a substantial practical impact on behavior even though
they have no definitive legal effect. 186 In such cases, the report observed,
the public would value an opportunity to influence the content of the rule
87
through pre-adoption notice and comment procedure.
180. Furthermore, neither section 2-104(3) or (4) clearly requires adoption of interpretive rules
because interpretations might be neither "standards" nor "principles."
181. The new Model Act provides for agency self-review, review by the governor, and review
through an administrative rules review committee of the legislature. See 1981 MODEL ACT, supra
note 10, at §§ 3-201 to 204.
182. See S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S2713 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982) (passage by a 94-0 vote).
183. See S.1080, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983), H.R. 220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), H.R. 2327
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), H.R. 3939, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
184. H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1982), reprinted in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101,
at 8 (proposing a new 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(3)) (emphasis added).
185. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 59 n.16, 61-62. The Senate bill was much less
attentive to this distinction. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
186. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 60.
187. Id. at 59-60.
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Although the substantial impact test was widely accepted during the
1970's, since that time an increasing number of courts have rejected it, in
part because it furnishes so little guidance to agencies or reviewing
on H.R. 746
courts. 188 However, the House Judiciary Committee report
189
tries valiantly to improve the predictability of the test.

First, the report limits the scope of the test by a restrictive definition
of the term "general applicability." 190 Ordinarily, a rule has "general
applicability" if it applies to an open-ended class of persons, rather than

to one or a few named recipients. 191 However, according to the Committee report, a rule is generally applicable only if it pertains to all or a
majority of regulated parties-not to single individuals or products or to
a defined class.192
This approach seems poorly considered. Regulations almost never

impinge on every private sector entity regulated by an agency, or even on
a majority of them. Agencies such as the FTC, the EPA, or OSHA, for

example, issue regulations that affect large numbers of businesses, but
even their legislative regulations seldom involve a majority of businesses

nationwide. Instead, both legislative and nonlegislative rules almost always involve subgroups, such as particular industries, groups within industries, particular products, or classes of beneficiaries. It is difficult to
understand why the substantial impact test should apply only to those
very few nonlegislative regulations that affect at least a majority of the
parties that an agency regulates. Often, the rules that are the most ques-

tionable, and most in need of public input, may be those that disadvan188. See supra notes 78-79, 100-06, and accompanying text.
189. The Committee emphasized that its substantial impact test would apply solely to nonlegislative rules. HousE REPORT, supra note 101, at 60. Thus the Committee would apparently preserve
the existing legal effect and definitiveness tests for distinguishing legislative and nonlegislative rules.
Consequently, H.R. 746 would do nothing to clarify the characterization problem. See supra notes
39-107 and accompanying text.
190. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 60-61 (rule must pertain "to all regulated parties or
a majority thereof").
191. See generally Comment, supra note 31, at 364-72. See also ArrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE APA, supra note 14, at 22-23. Some cases have equated "general applicability" with
"substantial impact." See, eg., Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1977); Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D.N.M. 1976). However, if "general applicability" meant "substantial impact," the generality test in H.R. 746 would seem to be redundant.
192. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 60-61. This definition of "generality" goes well beyond
what courts have required. When they addressed the issue of generality, courts found that "pervasiveness" of impact was sufficient. See, eg., Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858,
863 (D. Del. 1970) (impact on industry or important class of members or products of that industry).
The House Report stated that it specifically did not intend to require pre-adoption procedure
for the adoption of IRS revenue rulings. See HOUSE REPORT, supranote 101, at 62. Although IRS
rulings often have a significant adverse impact upon a large number of taxpayers, the exemption
from pre-adoption procedure seems designed to prevent disruption of IRS operations.
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tage a defined subgroup within an industry while benefitting another,
perhaps more influential, subgroup.
Second, the impact on persons outside the agency must be "substan' 193
tial," defined as "palpable and significant," not "incidental or trivial.
This definition may provide some guidance to agency staff members. But
if members of the public choose to litigate the validity of a nonlegislative
rule adopted without notice and comment, a reviewing court will be hard
pressed to conclude that the rule had only a "trivial" impact on them.
The bill's definition of "substantial" fails to describe how agencies or
courts should weigh the impact of a nonlegislative rule.
Finally, a nonlegislative rule must affect "substantive rights or obligations" rather than procedural rights or mere interests. 19 4 However, it
is often difficult to distinguish substantive and procedural rights, 195 and
even more difficult to distinguish rights and "mere interests." 196 These
concepts lack sufficiently firm content to guide either agencies or courts
in deciding whether pre-adoption procedures are legally required.
The Senate's version of regulatory reform legislation, S. 1080, required notice and comment where a nonlegislative or a procedural rule

has general applicability and "substantially alters or creates rights or obligations of persons outside the agency." 197 This provision reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between legislative and
nonlegislative rules. Only a statute or a legislative rule, made under delegated authority, can "alter or create" a "right or obligation." 198 Nevertheless, the Senate Judiciary Committee report makes clear that its test is
intended to reach nonlegislative rules. 199 Although it is somewhat mud193. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 61.
194. Id. The Judiciary Committee stated that this limitation would alter the judicial substantial
impact test, but did not explain which cases it disapproved. Id.
195. Under the APA, procedural rules are exempt from notice and comment proceedings. 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1982). However, rules that have a substantial impact on the rights or duties of
persons outside the agency are not "procedural." See supra note 80. Thus, the Judiciary Committee's substance-procedure test is circular. A rule has a substantial impact only if it affects substance
rather than procedure; but whether it affects substance rather than procedure depends on whether it
has a substantial impact!
196. See HousE REPORT, supra note 101, at 61 ("courts should identify and distinguish substantive rights or obligations from procedural rights, or from mere interests, in accordance with existing
law").
197. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 128 CONG. REc. S2713, S2713 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982).
198. See, eg., Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 720 F.2d 804, 812 (4th Cir. 1983) (EEOC
lacks legislative rulemaking power, so its rules cannot have impact on anyone's rights); Noel v.
Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975) (INS rules did not impose an obligation), cert denied,
423 U.S. 824 (1976). See also Asimow, supra note 7, at 547-51 (comparing "substantial impact"
standards focused on legal effect with those focused on practical effect).
199. SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 110-14.
Some of the decisions cited by the Senate report did observe that nonlegislative rules affected
substantive rights and obligations. See, eg., Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 481-82
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died, the report emphatically approves of the judicial substantial impact
test and criticizes the prevailing legal effect test.2 °
The Senate Report is even less helpful than the House Report in
supplying guidance to agencies or courts. According to the Senate Report, if a rule does not have general applicability, has only an insubstan-

tial impact, or affects only expectations, it would remain exempt from
notice and comment procedures. 20 1 Although the report does little to
define these nebulous generalities, it dispenses generous quantities of gratuitous advice. For example, it criticizes the use of nonlegislative rules to
modify existing understandings of the requirements of the statute or reg-

ulation, even though those understandings might have themselves arisen
from nonlegislative rules.20 2 The Senate's bill would effectively abolish
the nonlegislative rule exemption. Taken together, its standards and ad-

monitions are so broad that they appear to sweep all nonlegislative rules
203
of any consequence into notice and comment procedures.

The legislative substantial impact test proposed by either bill would
result in great confusion and would vastly increase the amount of litigation about the validity of controversial rules. In effect, therefore, it would
amount to a de facto repeal of the nonlegislative rule exemption. As we
2°4
have seen, the costs of such a repeal would far outweigh the benefits.
Thus, when Congress returns to the subject of regulatory reform, it
(2d Cir. 1972), cited in SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 113. However, this is true only in the
sense that the rules affected the behavior of private parties or agency officials, and thus had an
impact on the manner in which the public enjoyed its rights or discharged its obligations.
200. SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 111, 113.
201. See id. at 111-14. Like the House version, the Senate bill would require notice and comment only if a rule had "general applicability." However, the House Report defined this term so
narrowly that, taken literally, very few rules would have general applicability. See supranotes 19092 and accompanying text. There is no such caution in the Senate Report.
202. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 113 (an agency statement changing existing understanding of the requirement of a statute would be subject to notice and comment). Similarly, it
declares that only legislative rules should be used to fill gaps in existing regulations, to indicate
relevant factors in future rulemaking, to change existing licensing practices, or to supply guidance in
nuclear plant construction. Id. at 111-12. Yet each of these functions would often be discharged by
nonlegislative rules-often by agencies with no legislative rulemaking power at all.
203. The Senate Report accurately summarized the effect of its proposals: "Generally there are
few rules which automatically can be deemed exempt from section 553 rulemaking under this provision merely because they belong to a class of rules which normally are exempt. It is conceivable that
a rule, of a type usually considered interpretative, may in certain circumstances have the kind of
substantial impact on rights or obligations which remove it from the ambit of this modified exemption for interpretive rules." Id. at 113. Thus, the Report observed that IRS revenue rulings would
ordinarily be exempt from notice and comment rulemaking, but promptly criticized a case that
refused to require notice and comment before adoption of a ruling. See id. at 112-13 (criticizing
National Restaurant Ass'n v. Simon, 411 F. Supp. 993, 999 (D.D.C. 1976) (revenue rulings are
interpretive rules). The House Report approved the NationalRestaurantcase. See HousE REPORT,
supra note 101, at 62.
204. See supra notes 107-30 and accompanying text.
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should abandon efforts to legislate the substantial impact test and should
seek a much more cautious approach to the problem of public participation in the adoption of nonlegislative rules. The next section of this article suggests one such approach.
C. Post-adoption Notice and Comment: Administrative Conference
Recommendation 76-5.
In 1976, the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS) adopted Recommendation 76-5, a modest reform proposal addressed to agencies rather than to Congress or the courts. 205 Recommendation 76-5 suggested that voluntary notice and comment procedures be
employed when an agency anticipates that a nonlegislative rule might
have a substantial impact on the public. 20 6 This voluntary approach ech20 7
oes admonitions in the legislative history of the APA.
In the case of generally applicable nonlegislative rules that lack a
substantial impact, ACUS recommended that an agency invite members
of the public to submit comments for a thirty day period after the rule is
adopted. 208 The agency would be required to respond to the comments
within a sixty day period. 20 9 This recommendation for mandatory postadoption comment is suitable for inclusion in regulatory reform
legislation.
The post-adoption procedure has a number of advantages over both
present law and other regulatory proposals. First, it would not delay the
effective date of a rule. Because most nonlegislative rules are either trivial or clearly valid, they will elicit no comments and thus require no administrative response. Indeed, post-adoption comment does not differ
significantly from the existing provision in section 553(e) of the APA,
which allows interested persons to petition for the amendment or repeal
205. 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1984). See also Asimow, supra note 7, at 573-84. This Recommendation influenced the House Judiciary Committee's decision to adopt the substantial impact test. See
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 62. Consistent with Recommendation 76-5, ACUS has also
recommended post-adoption comment in the case of rules adopted under the good cause exemption.
I C.F.L § 305.83-2 (1984).
206. 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1984).
207. The APA legislative history indicates that Congress wanted agencies to use pre-adoption
procedures when adopting nonlegislative rules in cases where it would be helpful to them or to the
public. See APA Legislative History, supra note 94, at 187. The courts have also admonished agencies to utilize pre-adoption procedures, and agencies quite frequently do so. See Guardian Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (recommending but not requiring the
use of notice and comment); Asimow, supra note 7, at 524-28, 542, 559-60.
208. 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1984).
209. Id. This procedure could be omitted if an agency found it would serve no public purpose or
that it would be so burdensome as to outweigh any foreseeable gain. Id.
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of a rule.2 10 As a result, post-adoption procedure should not significantly
deter agencies from adopting nonlegislative rules.
Second, a requirement of post-adoption procedure would in practice
lead agencies to provide pre-adoption procedures for important rules that
are expected to provoke substantial comment. In such situations, the
staff may well prefer the usual and familiar pre-adoption routine instead
of mandatory reconsideration of an already-adopted rule. Consequently,
advance public participation in nonlegislative rulemaking should increase
substantially.
Third, post-adoption comment periods can be quite effective. The
comments will, in many cases, identify shortcomings in the rule that can
be swiftly repaired. 211 When members of the public know that their input must be read, considered, and commented upon, they will be more
likely to take the trouble to make comments.
Fourth, a record consisting of public comments and agency responses would be invaluable to a court engaged in pre-enforcement judicial review of the validity of a nonlegislative rule. 2 12 The absence of a
record makes review more difficult and encourages courts to hold the
rules unripe for review. 21 3 The availability of a more detailed record
would assist a court in determining, for example, whether a nonlegislative rule is reasonable or arbitrary or whether it is consistent with the
underlying statute.
Finally, post-adoption comment invites the public to share in the
process of making all nonlegislative rules. In fact, because a rule that has
been adopted is more visible than a proposed rule, it might attract even
wider attention and comment than a pre-adoption invitation. Greater
public involvement should enhance the legitimacy of the rules. At the
same time, post-adoption procedure would not, in the vast majority of
cases, delay the adoption of rules nor should it discourage agencies from
adopting them.
210. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1982).
211. See, eg., Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175, 188 (lst Cir. 1983) (Secretary changed rules in
response to post-adoption comments).
212. Moreover, a person who seeks pre-enforcement review might well be required first to exhaust the post-adoption procedure remedy. Such a requirement would be an additional incentive for
affected persons to take part in the comment process, would improve the record on review, and
would minimize the number of obstructive judicial challenges to probably valid rules.
213. See, eg., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. O'Connor, 747 F.2d 748, 752-57 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 736 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (general statements of policy are not subject to
judicial review if there is no immediate and significant impact). However, a number of nonlegislative
rules have been subjected to pre-enforcement review. See, eg., National Automatic Laundry and
Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 691-700 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See Asimow, supra note 7, at
567-69.
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Of course, there is one obvious disadvantage to post-adoption procedure-comments made after a rule is adopted may be less effective in
influencing the rulemaking process. The thinking of the staff undoubtedly rigidifies after an agency has adopted and published a rule in final
form. At that point, both the staff and the agency heads may be less open
to alternatives, and may react defensively to critical comments. For that
reason, members of the public might be less willing to take the trouble to
21 4
prepare comments.
Several recent cases suggest that post-effective comment may indeed
be a meaningful process. These decisions address the issue of whether an
invitation to submit comments after a rule is adopted can validly substitute for pre-adoption notice and comment. While earlier cases disapproved this expedient, 21 5 the trend may be reversing. For example, in
Levesque v. Block, 2 16 plaintiffs challenged rules adopted by the Department of Agriculture as invalid because they were adopted without prior
notice and comment. 2 17 The Department claimed that the rules were
exempt from notice and comment requirements under both the interpretive and good cause exemptions. 21 8 The First Circuit rejected the
agency's claims, but refused to invalidate the rules because the agency
had invited and received post-adoption comments.2 19 In response to the
comments, the Department of Agriculture made a number of changes in
the rules, and gave reasonable replies to those suggestions that it declined
to follow. 220 Under those circumstances, the court granted relief only to
persons with claims arising between the invalid initial promulgation of
the rules and the effective date of the rule as re-promulgated after the
comment period. 221 Levesque and other recent decisions 222 indicate that
214. Comments on already-adopted rules could not be ignored. ACUS Recommendation 76-5
requires the staff to comment on the submissions. 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1984). This assures at least a
perfunctory response to public comments.
215. See, eg., New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Standard Oil Co. v.
Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029, 1061-62 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979).
216. 723 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1983).
217. Id. at 178-79.
218. Id. at 179.
219. Id. at 179-89. The Secretary received 130 comments on the rules. Id. at 188.
220. Id. at 188-89.
221. Id. at 189.
222. See Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Department of Agriculture's
open-minded treatment of post-promulgation comments overcame any presumption against a late
comment period); Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1980) (rule invalidly adopted in reliance on good cause exemption remains in effect pending new cycle of notice and
comment). See also Note, Remedies for Noncompliance with Section 553 of the AdministrativeProcedure Act: A CriticalEvaluation of United States Steel and Western Oil & Gas, 1982 DuKE L.J. 461,
476-82.
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a post-effective comment period need not be a sham and can be a reason-

ably satisfactory solution to a difficult problem.
Some opponents of this proposal have complained that it will increase staff workload, 223 because the staff will have to respond to comments, and perhaps reconsider rules, within a defined time frame. 224 Not
surprisingly, the reconsideration of nonlegislative rules is rarely a high
priority task. However, it is unlikely that anyone will comment on the

vast majority of all nonlegislative rules. Moreover, the public can create
the same burden under existing law by petitioning for repeal or amend22 5
ment of any rule.
E. Regulatory Reform: Substance and Procedure.
The history of American administrative law demonstrates a steady

trend toward judicialization of process, administrative openness, and increased judicial review. That history also suggests a persistent mixture of
procedural and substantive concerns. 226 Many times, the advocates of
new procedures are animated not so much by procedural concerns but by
227
hostility toward the substantive programs that the agencies pursue.
Sometimes opponents of a new substantive program successfully ne-

gotiate for statutory provision of detailed procedures that, in practice,
render the regulatory program cumbersome and unworkable. In other

cases, opponents of existing programs who lack the political muscle to
achieve deregulation or changes in the substantive provisions of a statute

will concentrate instead on procedural reforms. By making it difficult
and costly for an agency to adopt rules or conduct adjudications, these
reformers hope that the agency will adopt fewer rules and adjudicate

fewer cases or that new procedures will slant whatever regulatory outThe Senate bill would have required post-effective comments for rules adopted under the good
cause exemption. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., (1982) (proposed amendment to 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(2)(C)); see Jordan, supra note 81, at 169-70.
223. See letters to Robert Anthony, Chairman of the Administrative Conference, from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (March 8, 1977), the Secretary of Labor (Sept. 8, 1976), and the ICC
(Aug. 20, 1976), all on file with the author.
224. If the post-adoption procedure were embodied in the APA, the 60-day response period
should be made more flexible to take account of agency workload or other priorities. Perhaps the
agency should be required only to respond within a reasonable time.
225. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1982).
226. See Davis, Regulatory Reform and CongressionalControl of Regulation, 17 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 1199, 1199-1200 (1982) (noting that a schism exists between regulatory reformers who favor
regulation generally but nevertheless see the need for improvements in regulatory procedures, and
those regulatory reformers who are simply proponents of deregulation).
227. See Verkuil, The Emerging Concept ofAdministrative Procedure,78 COLUM. L. REv. 258,
268-78 (1978) (discussing the connection between substantive opposition to regulation and procedural reforms during the 1930's).
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puts the agency manages to produce. 228 Sometimes reformers seem intent on laying as many snares as possible in the path of an agency in
order to increase the likelihood of a mistake and judicial invalidation on
procedural grounds.2 29 It seems evident to the author that many current
advocates of regulatory reform advance procedural proposals as a surrogate for substantive deregulation that they lack the political power to
achieve.
This article is a plea to regulatory reformers to treat legislative and
nonlegislative rules separately. Many reasons why one might favor reforms of or controls over the legislative rulemaking process are not at all
applicable to nonlegislative rules. Even if one seeks to make rulemaking
more difficult so that agencies will do less of it, it does not follow that one
should try to make nonlegislative rulemaking more difficult.
Given that a scheme of regulation exists, and given that an agency
has adopted the legislative rules necessary to set it in motion, it serves the
interests of everyone-the agency and its staff, the regulated parties, the
public, staunch proponents and opponents of the regulatory scheme,
seekers of efficiency, seekers of fairness-that the agency provide guidance in the form of generally applicable interpretive rules and policy
statements. Costly and cumbersome procedures that would enhance the
ability of a few members of the public to influence the content of a few
important nonlegislative rules seriously disserve all these interests because they will necessarily decrease the flow of nonlegislative rules.
V.

CONCLUSION

Nonlegislative rules have puzzled students of the administrative process for many decades. They are concerned about both the timing and
the scope of judicial review of such rules, about the extent to which they
can be retroactive or prospective and whether they bind the agency,
about the effect of their nonpublication, and about how legislative and
nonlegislative rules can be distinguished from one another. Most of all,
228. See Magat & Schroeder, Administrative ProcessReform in a DiscretionaryAge: The Role of
Social Consequences, 1984 DuKE L.J. 301 (impact on outcomes of procedural reforms); Chairman's
Message, 35 AD. L. REv. iii, v (Winter 1983) (interest in procedural reforms is motivated by desire
to influence substantive rules); Davis, supra note 226, at 1201-04 (overregulation of the economy
requires better management of agencies); Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit,and

the Supreme Court, 1978 SuP. Cr. REv. 345, 404-09 (rulemaking procedural reforms often are attempts to limit or alter agency power); cf Scalia, Regulatory Reform: The Game Has Changed, 5
REG. Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 13, 13 (noting that procedural reforms make substantive deregulation
difficult).
229. See, eg., Rago, Rulemaking underthe Model State APA: An Opportunity Missed, 34 AD. L.
REv. 445, 446 (1982) (arguing that the Model State APA does not provide adequate safeguards
against arbitrary agency actions).
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observers sharply disagree about whether any form of public participation should be required in connection with the adoption of the rules and,
if so, when it should be accorded and what form it should take.
This article has criticized all of the different approaches to the problem of public participation in nonlegislative rulemaking. The shortcomings of the new Model Act and of the federal regulatory reform proposals
are manifest, but the status quo also leaves much to be desired. At least,
under the legal effect and definitiveness tests, an agency can be relatively
but not absolutely certain that a court will defer to a carefully prepared
characterization. Yet when rules have a substantial impact on members
of the public, pre-adoption notice and comment procedure would serve
the interests of improved rules as well as administrative responsiveness
and effectiveness. Such participation is assured by a judicial or legislative
substantial impact test, but that test fails to give sufficient guidance to
agencies or reviewing courts. Even if a nonlegislative rule lacks substantial impact on the lives or fortunes of those affected by it, the rule would
in many cases benefit from the input of interested members of the public.
Yet to open all nonlegislative rules to advance public participation would
have a devastatingly negative effect on the administrative process.
On the whole, it seemed to the Administrative Conference and it
seems to this writer that the modest benefit to the public from a postadoption comment system would outweigh the modest additional costs
that it would impose on agency staffs. Reformers should seriously question the much costlier requirements imposed by the 1981 Model Act and
the proposals to write some form of impact test into the federal APA.
These "reforms" would have perverse effects and would not advance the
cause of regulatory reform.

